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Section 295-C of Pakistan’s penal code prohibits insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص 
and carries a mandatory death penalty. This law was passed based on a claim of ijma‘ 
(consensus among Islamic scholars) that such an offense is subject to a hadd (divinely 
fixed) punishment. Nearly half of those charged under this statute crimes of hadd are 
Christians, who make up only about four percent of Pakistan’s population. Yet there 
is no consensus among Islamic scholars on the death penalty for non-Muslims who 
insult the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. Some early Islamic scholars held there was no punishment 
at all in such cases, and most said it was a ta‘zir offense, i.e., subject to discretionary 
punishment or none at all. 
Under Islamic law, whether and how ta‘zir punishment is applied depends on 
the interests of the common good (maslaha). Pakistan’s application of Section 295-C 
to non-Muslims promotes harm: mob violence, disrespect for the law, oppression of 
minorities and the poor, and damage to Islam’s reputation. Moreover, such cases are 
adjudicated by judges who have no expertise in Islamic law or the interpretive tools of 
Islamic jurisprudence needed to mitigate the statute’s harm. Therefore, applying this 
section to non-Muslims contradicts Islamic law. 
Under Islamic law and from a policy perspective, the only relevant question is 
whether enforcing Section 295-C against non-Muslims promotes the common good. 
Because it clearly does not, the government of Pakistan should immediately stop doing 
so and pardon those accused or convicted under it. Muslim religious leaders should 
make it clear that Islam does not require the death of non-Muslims who insult the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and that the true way to show love for him is not mob violence, but 
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The purpose of this monograph is to give sincere advice to the people and 
government of Pakistan. Allah states in the Quran:
Indeed, humanity is at loss: except those who believe and do righteous deeds, 
and advise each other with truth, and advise each other with patience.1 
And the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:
This religion is sincere good will.2 
The author is certain that Pakistan is better and more worthy than the problems 
described herein. The intended outcome of this effort is nothing but the well-being 
and happiness of Pakistan’s people in this life and the next.
 إِنَّ اإِلنَسـَن لَفِى ُخْسٍر - إاِلَّ الَِّذيَن َءاَمنُوْا َوَعِملُوْا الصالحات َوتََواَصْوْا بِاْلَحقِّ
ْبِر َوتََواَصْوْا بِالصَّ
يُن النَِّصيَحةُ الدِّ
1 Quran, Surah al-Asr 103:2-3.
2 Imam Abul-Hussain Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. 2007. English Translation of Vol. 1 of Sahih Muslim. 




Life is a gift from God, and every person has only one life to live in this ephemeral 
realm. Human beings are very special creatures in that they have been given sovereignty 
over all life forms on this planet. According to Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) in the 
“Book of Repentance” of his magnum opus Ihya ‘Ulum ad-Din, the gravest of mortal sins 
are those that seek to alienate humans from their Creator and deny His worthiness 
of human devotion.3 These sins include idolatry, disbelief, atheism, apostasy, and 
blasphemy. Since human beings were created to serve and worship God, when they 
refuse to acknowledge God’s sovereignty and gratuitous blessings, they are deemed to 
be ingrates and estranged from their Maker. Furthermore, they expose their souls to 
the eternal damnation of Hell. 
Secondary to those sins wherein a person’s heart turns away from God, al-Ghazali 
places sins committed against human life and bodily integrity (nafs).4  If human beings 
are created to serve God, then to take their life would naturally undermine God’s goal 
for humanity. Therefore, killing or other physical violence against a fellow human 
being is deemed punishable and worthy of retribution (qisas), unless God Himself 
has ordained it for transgressions that warrant punitive, redemptive, exemplary, or 
restorative adjustment. In other words, capital and corporal punishments appear to 
violate this divine “no harm” rule, but because the presumptive benefits flowing from 
punishment (e.g. protecting society from theft or insurrection) often outweigh its 
harms, the latter are deemed a tolerable sacrifice for the sake of communal harmony 
and the common good.
According to the Quran:
...whoever takes a life for other than murder or for sowing discord in the land, it 
as if he has murdered all of humanity. And whoever spares one life, it is as if he 
has spared the lives of all humanity.5
َمْن قَتََل نَْفًسا بَِغْيِر نَْفٍس أَْو فََساٍد فِي اْلَْرِض فََكأَنََّما قَتََل النَّاَس َجِميًعا
َوَمْن أَْحيَاَها فََكأَنََّما أَْحيَا النَّاَس َجِميًعا 
by Abdullah Hamid bin Ali
3 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. 1957. Vol. 4 of Ihya Ulum ad-Din. 4 vols. Cairo: Dar Ihya al-Kutub al-
Arabiyya, 15-17.
4 Ibid.
5 Quran, Surah al-Ma’idah 5:33.
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This Quranic decree seemingly clashes with the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص permission to 
execute formerly married fornicators (ath-thayyib az-zani),6 “those who change their 
lifeway,”7 and “those who abandon their lifeway, defecting from the collective.”8 Even 
more controversial is his supposed statement, “Kill whoever reviles a prophet.”9 Despite 
the spuriousness of this hadith,10 most mainstream Muslim scholars have historically 
considered disparaging Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص to be a capital crime that warrants 
the perpetrator’s execution, regardless of his or her retraction or repentance.
Blasphemy injunctions are curious in that they not only appear to contravene 
the Quranic teachings on God’s forgiveness of “all sins,”11 but also because many 
scholars generally extended the applicability of blasphemy laws to non-Muslims living 
in protected status in Muslim lands (ahl adh-dhimmah). Prominent theologians, jurists, 
and Sufis alike stood in near unison regarding the governors’ religious duty to execute 
all such blasphemers and disparagers, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, just as they 
agreed upon the lack of governmental discretionary authority to stay the execution 
even if the person retracts, repents, or converts to Islam. But this virtual unanimity 
was not much different from their near consensus on the obligation to kill apostates. 
It is often a major challenge for contemporary minds to contain their outrage at 
rules that seem so irrational and illiberal. But considering the nature of the world order 
under which the pre-moderns lived may help one appreciate—even if one still may 
not agree with—the reasoning of earlier times. In the pre-modern world people lived 
under the presumption of war rather than of peace, which is a generally acknowledged 
convention today. Under that world order, people’s lives, wealth, honor, and freedom 
were at constant risk of being violated if collectives had no peace treaty, strategic 
alliance, or truce with their neighbors. In the absence of such agreements, marauding, 
raping, kidnapping, and enslaving captives were considered fair game. And since 
culture, belief, and sociopolitical coherence were all intertwined, the early Muslim 
community in particular and other nations in general made no distinction between 
defense of “religion” and defense of the “polity” and “community,” whose stability 
ensured their relative safety from invasion and disharmony. 
6 Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari. 1997. The English Translation of Vol. 8 of the Meanings of Sahih 
al-Bukhari. Trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Riyadh: Dar As-Salaam, 423-424. See also Muslim. 2007. 
Vol. 4, 442.
7 Ar. “من بدل دينه فاقتلوه”. Al-Bukhari. 1997, vol. 9, 46.
8 Ar. “التارك لدينه المفارق للجماعة”. Muslim. 2007. Vol. 4, 442.
9 Ar. “من سب نبيا فاقتلوه”. Collected by, inter alia, Abul-Qasim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad at-Tabarani. 1997. 
Al-Mu’ jam as-Sagheer. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 236.
10 See, e.g., Nur ad-Din Abi Bakr al-Haytami. 1994. Vol. 6 of Majmu’a az-Zawa’id wa Manba’ al-
Fawa’id. 10 vols. Cairo: Maktaba al-Qudsi, 252. Al-Haytami says that An-Nasa’i, an early hadith compiler, 
accused one of the narrators of this hadith of lying: رماه النسائي بالكذب
11 Quran, Surah Zumar 39:53.
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In this sense the Arabic word deen, typically translated as “religion” and in this 
introduction as “lifeway,” is more than the mere “belief” in Islamic theology and its 
revealed moral code. Consequently, when Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, “Kill whoever 
changes his deen,” it could not have meant that one should kill any person who loses 
faith in Islam as God’s true religion. Otherwise, the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص would have killed 
Qurrah ibn Maysarah, Abdullah b. Sa‘d  ibn Abi as-Sarh, and al-Ash‘ath ibn Qays, all 
of whom apostatized during his lifetime, as well as those Muslims who recanted after 
he told them of his Night Journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and back. If he ordered 
any such executions, it was either due to the fact that they had taken innocent life 
(e.g., Ibn Khatal)12 or incited others to commit murder. In both instances, the Prophetic 
orders conform to the Quranic teachings that exclude “murderers” and “those who 
sow discord in the land” from those whose lives, if taken, would be equivalent to 
murdering all of humanity.13 
What all of this means is that the soundest rationale undergirding the 
punishment warranted for apostasy and blasphemy is that these acts constituted a form 
of defection or high treason. The verdict could not validly rely on the mere premise 
that the apostate “no longer believes in God” or “the religion of Islam,” nor on the 
notion that the non-Muslim “has openly professed negative views about the prophet 
 whose religion is commonly known to be rejected by that very non-Muslim. Such ”ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
people’s rejection of the message is no secret. Moreover, if they had not entertained 
such negative views, they naturally would have converted. In other words, the non-
Muslims’ disbelief is in and of itself a form of blasphemy, yet not in a form that warrants 
punishment. Consequently, the most logical conclusion is that pre-modern scholars 
were concerned with the breakdown of the community’s cohesiveness, as opposed to 
mere difference of belief, and thus feared that allowing such public proclamations or 
defection to another religion would encourage insurrection or invasion. 
12 Ibn Khatal was a tax collector for the Muslims who murdered someone, apostatized, and fled to 
Mecca. The Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص order concerning his execution is related in al-Bukhari, 1997. Vol. 4, 173-174, 
among other sources.  For a discussion by a classical-era author of the reasons for his execution, see Yusuf 
ibn Abdullah ibn Abdul-Barr. [N.d.] Vol. 6 of At-Tamhid lima fil-Muwatta’ min al-Ma’ani wal-Asanid. 
26 vol. Cairo: Maktaba Ibn Taymiyya, 167. Ibn Abdul-Barr wrote in part that Ibn Khatal “had killed a 
man from the Muslim Ansar, then apostated. This is what the compilers of the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص biography 
mentioned, and for all of them it was what justified his execution.” In Arabic the passage reads:  كان قد قتل 
رجال من األنصار مسلما ثم ارتد . كذلك ذكر أهل السير، وهذا يبيح دمه عند الجميع
13 For a detailed discussion of apostasy in Islamic jurisprudence, see Abdullah Bin Hamid Ali. 
2011. “Preserving the Freedom for Faith: Reevaluating the Politics of Compulsion.” The Review of Faith 




The Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص mission was to call everyone to the worship of the Creator and 
to paradise. The ensuing resistance and persecution were deemed unjust because his 
mission appealed to a sentiment common to all human beings (i.e., the right to believe 
and to openly profess and follow one’s conscience). It would have been hypocritical of 
Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص to circumscribe the right to follow one’s conscience as long as 
doing so posed no threat to the physical safety, harmony, and unity of Muslim society. 
For this very reason, the Quran unequivocally states, “Let there be no compulsion in 
religion”14 and “If your Lord had so willed, all humanity would believe. Will you then 
compel people to be believers, while it is not for any soul to believe except by God’s 
permission?”15 In numerous verses God reminds the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصthat his sole duty 
to proclaim the message,16 offer the clear proclamation,17 and “Remind! For, you are 
merely a reminder.”18 In the same vein, He informs the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص that he is not 
their keeper,19 trustee,20 compeller,21 or overlord.22 
If the views of pre-modern Muslim scholars can be contextualized in such a 
way, the image of Islam as a religion of promise, purpose, and peace should be easily 
achievable. If, however, contemporary jurists insist on maintaining the bifurcation 
of the world into friendly (dar as-salam) and hostile territories (dar al-harb) between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, we only reinforce the “clash of civilizations” narrative as 
well as the claim of Islam’s inability to solve contemporary challenges. 
Dr. Abdullah bin Hamid Ali
Assistant Professor of Islamic Law & Prophetic Tradition, Zaytuna College
Founding Director, Lamppost Education Initiative
14 Quran, Surah al-Baqarah 2:256.
15 Quran, Surah Yunus 10:99-100.
16 Quran, Surah al-Ma’idah 5:95.
17 Quran, Surah an-Nur 24:54.
18 Quran, Surah al-Ghashiya 88:21-22.
19 Quran, Surah an-Nisa’ 4:80.
20 Quran, Surah al-An‘am 6:107.
21 Quran, Surah Qaf 50:45.





In June 2009 a group of village women near Lahore, Pakistan, quarreled while 
picking berries. The incident began when several Muslim women refused to drink from 
a cup touched by the lone Christian woman among them, Asia Bibi, on the grounds that 
she was “unclean.” The case ended with her being placed on death row, accused under 
Section 295-C of the Pakistani Penal Code for insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص in the heat of 
the argument.
In November 2010 Governor Salmaan Taseer of Punjab province met with her 
and announced that he would appeal to President Asif Ali Zardari for a pardon.23 In 
response, segments of the religious establishment accused him of implementing a 
“Western conspiracy against Islam” and threatened to unleash “anarchy” if she were 
released.24 Religious leaders and organizations went so far as to declare Taseer a 
blasphemer and an apostate because he had sought a pardon for a blasphemer.25 On 
January 4, 2011, he was assassinated by his bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri, who argued that 
the murder was justified because the governor was an apostate.26 On February 29, 2016, 
the government executed Qadri for Taseer’s murder. His supporters subsequently 
turned his grave into a shrine,27 where they have since held rallies and honored him in 
other ways.   
Overview
1
23 “Taseer to take Aasia’s clemency appeal to president.” 2010. The Express Tribune. November 11. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/79315/asiya-bibi-seeks-presidential-pardon/.
24 “Sunni Ittehad Council warns of anarchy if Aasia pardoned.” 2010. Dawn. November 26. https://
www.dawn.com/news/585859/sunni-ittehad-council-warns-of-anarchy-if-asia-pardoned.
25 “Events that led to Taseer’s murder.” 2011. The News. January 6. https://www.thenews.com.pk/
archive/print/278526-events-that-led-to-taseer%E2%80%99s-murder.
26 Salman Masood, and Carlotta Gall. 2011. “Salman Taseer, Punjab Governor, Shot Dead in Islamabad.” 
The New York Times. January 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/world/asia/05pakistan.html.
27 Asad Hashim. 2017. “In Pakistan, a shrine to murder for ‘blasphemy.’” Al Jazeera. February 17.
h t t p : // w w w . a l j a z e e r a . c o m / i n d e p t h / f e a t u r e s / 2 0 1 7/ 0 2 / p a k i s t a n - s h r i n e - m u r d e r -
blasphemy-170206103344830.html.
*Previous page: photo illustration of a memorial to slain Punjab governor Salman Taseer and his assassin, Mumtaz Qadri.
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Ms. Bibi’s case is not unique. Non-Muslims make up only about 4 percent of 
Pakistan’s population, but were about 40 percent of those charged between 1953 and 
2012 with this offense.28 Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed, 
most such cases originate in personal vendettas rather than genuine instances of 
blasphemy.29 Misuse of Section 295-C means that the mere accusation can ruin or 
even end a person’s life30  and “frequently trigger[s] mob violence before any official 
actions like police arrests and judicial trials can be taken.”31 In other words, this law 
has become a driver of sectarian violence, lawlessness, and instability.   
In this monograph,32 I argue that the government’s way of handling such 
allegations is not justified by Islamic law, but rather opposes the most authoritative 
sources of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence that it claims to follow. Indeed, far from 
vindicating the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, the treatment meted out to the accused non-Muslims 
detracts from the spirit of the religion with which he was sent. Moreover, Pakistan’s 
prosecution of such people is contrary to Islam in that it causes great harm to the 
people and the government by generating instability, injustice, and disrespect for the 
law.
28 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State. 2015. Supreme Court of Pakistan Criminal Appeals 
No. 210 and 211 of 2015. www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Crl.A._210_2015.pdf: 26. Others 
have calculated that religious minorities are 52 percent of those accused in blasphemy cases.  Menaal Safi 
Munshey. 2015. “Blasphemy Laws and Human Rights in Pakistan.” Oxford Human Rights Hub. April 16. 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/blasphemy-laws-and-human-rights-in-pakistan/.
29 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State 2015, 26.
30 Ibid., 26.
31 Amjad Mahmood Khan. 2015. “How Anti-Blasphemy Laws Engender Terrorism.” Harvard 
International Law Journal Online 56. http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/Antiblasphemy-
Laws_0608.pdf, 12.
32 This publication was made possible with funding from Templeton Religion Trust. The author would 





Pakistan’s blasphemy laws originate in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) enacted for the 
Subcontinent by the British colonial government in 1860.33 The code was intended “to 
replace a patchwork of Muslim and Hindu laws overlaid with a mixture of transplanted 
English laws and East Indian Company regulations to ensure, as much as possible, a 
singular standard of justice.”34  The Indian Law Commission, the body that drafted the IPC, 
explicitly stated that its goal was to replace the law “of the Mohammedans.”35 In essence, 
the code was “designed to make imperial authority more effective and legitimate.”36 
Just as Pakistan’s penal code does today, the 1860 code included Chapter 15, “Of 
Offences Relating to Religion,”37 which read:
Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held 
sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion 
of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely 
to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any 
person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or 
makes any gesture in the sight of that person, or places any object in the sight of 
that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.38
The Origins of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law
2
33 Osama Siddique and Zahra Hayat. 2008. “Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in 
Pakistan – Controversial Origins, Design Defects and Free Speech Implications.” Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 17(2), 336.
34 Barry Wright. 2016. “Macaulay’s Indian Penal Code: Historical Context and Originating Principles.” 
In Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code: The Legacies and Modern Challenges of Criminal Law 
Reform, ed. Wing-Cheong Chan, Barry Wright, and Stanley Yeo. London: Routledge, 22.
35 Siddique and Hayat 2008, 336.
36 Wright 2016, 22.
37 Siddique and Hayat 2008, 337.
38 Indian Penal Code Act XLV. [1860] 1861. Indian Penal Code. Calcutta: G.C. Hay & Co., cited in 
Siddique and Hayat 2008, 338.
*Previous page: Colonial officials of the British Empire.
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In 1927, the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XXV of 1927) inserted Section 295-A into 
Chapter 15, which read:
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious 
feelings of any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words, either spoken or written, 
or by visible representations, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the 
religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.39  
Historians generally conclude that “the purpose of Chapter 15 was the maintenance 
of order in a multi-religious society and the containment of attacks targeted at any 
religion.”40 This was important to the British colonial state because it “partly justified 
its imperial mission as impartially regulating and administering a multiplicity of 
particularistic communities through the rule of law. In this imperial legal rhetoric, 
the colonizers had brought peace to, and secured order in, primordial, fractious, and 
antagonistic religious communities.”41  
In terms of Chapter 15 specifically, the commission wrote that its purpose was 
to avert any risk of “the dissolution of society.”42  This was a danger, a member of the 
commission explained, because in India,
the Government has so much to apprehend from religious excitement among the 
people. The Christians are numerically a very small minority of the population, 
and in possession of all the highest posts in the Government, the tribunals, and 
in the army. Under their rule are placed millions of Mahomedans, of differing 
sects, but all strongly attached to the fundamental articles of the Mahomedan 
creed, and tens of millions of Hindoos, strongly attached to doctrines and rites 
which Christians and Mahomedans join in reprobating. Such a state of things is 
pregnant with dangers which can only be averted by a firm adherence to the true 
principles of toleration.43 
39 Ibid., 338.
40 Ibid., 338.
41 Asad Ali Ahmad. 2009. “Specters of Macaulay.” In Censorship South Asia: Cultural Regulation from 
Sedition to Seduction, ed. Raminder Kaur and William Mazzarella. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
42 Ibid., 336-37.
43 Lady Trevelyan, ed. 1866. Vol. 2 of The Works of Lord Macaulay Complete. London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 490-91.
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Pakistan inherited the IPC, including Chapter 15, when it was created in 1947 
by the partition of India.44 During his 1977-1988 rule, General Zia-ul-Haq introduced 
five additional sections to Chapter 15 via martial law amendments45  that “pertain only 
to offenses against Islam, as opposed to applying generally to all religions as did the 
original clauses in Chapter 15.”46 The new sections included 295-B, which punishes 
defiling the Quran; 295-C, which punishes insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص; and Sections 298 
(A-C), which imposes restrictions on the Ahmadi sect.47 Section 295-C, introduced in 
1986, provides:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by 
any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred 
name of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) shall be punished 
with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.48 
During parliamentary debate in 1986, proponents of this section based their argument 
on the supposed unanimity (ijma‘) among Islamic religious scholars that death 
for insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is a hadd (divinely fixed) punishment for everyone, 
regardless of religion.49 
In 1990 a petition challenging Section 295-C was brought before Pakistan’s 
Federal Shariat Court, which has “exclusive jurisdiction to hear petitions challenging 
state laws as repugnant to Islam.”50 This petition argued that the alternative 
punishment of life imprisonment for violating the statute was repugnant to Islamic law 
and should be declared void, and that anyone who violated Section 295-C must receive 
the death penalty.51  The court heard from several members of the country’s religious 
establishment and eventually ruled that “all the Jurisconsults and Scholars agreed” 
that death is mandatory for such an act. The court thus struck down the alternative 
punishment of life imprisonment and held that death was the only possible sentence.52 
44 Muhammad Khalid Masud. 2005. “Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Shari’a 
in Pakistan.” In Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies. Reconstructing the Public Sphere in 
Muslim Majority Societies, ed. Armando Salvatore and Mark Levine. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 173.
45 Siddique and Hayat 2008, 337.
46 Ibid., 337.
47 Ibid., 311-12
48 Government of Pakistan. 1986. Pakistani Penal Code § 295-C.
49 The National Assembly of Pakistan. 1986. July 9 Debates. Karachi: Printing Corporation of Pakistan 
Press. https://www.scribd.com/document/327051790/9th-July-Parliamentary-Debate-on-295C, 3209-3238.
50 “Federal Shariat Court.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito. http://www.
oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e648. July 3, 2017.







There is no Ijma‘ on the Death Penalty for Non-Muslims who Disparage 
the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
As noted above, much of the discourse in Pakistan concerning its blasphemy laws 
centers on the supposed ijma‘ (consensus among Muslim jurists) on executing anyone 
who insults the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. This assertion is of great significance because ijma‘ is a 
source of authority second only to the Quran and Sunnah53 in all four of Islam’s Sunni 
legal schools (madhabs).54 Yet contrary to the conclusions of the country’s Parliament 
and Federal Shariat Court, a closer examination of Islamic jurisprudence reveals that 
there actually is no ijma‘ on this question.
Al-Khattabi (d. 998), a Shafi‘i jurisprudent, explained that the authorities 
“differed in the matter when the insulter was a non-Muslim.”55 Imam Abu Hanifah (d. 
767), the founder of the Hanafi school, Pakistan’s predominant madhab, said: “They 
[i.e., non-Muslims] are not killed for insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, for that which they 
have against him of polytheism is worse.”56 In other words, their worship of other 
than God and their belief that the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصwas untruthful are far worse than their 
Pakistan’s application of its blasphemy law 
to non-Muslims is not justified by Islamic law
3
53 Taha Jabir al-Alwani. 1990. Usul al-Fiqh: Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence. Herndon: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 42. This principle is elucidated by Ibn Kathir, the well-known 
fourteenth-century commentator on the Quran, in his commentary on Surah an-Nisa’ 4:100: “The Ummah 
of Muhammad is immune from error when they all agree on something, a miracle that serves to increase 
their honor, due to the greatness of their  Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص” Abul-Fida’ Isma’il ibn Umar ibn Kathir, Tafsir 
al-Quran al-‘Adheem. The term ijma‘ is often misunderstood and misused. See, for example, Abdullah bin 
Hamid Ali. [N.d.] “Scholarly Consensus: Ijmā’ Between Use & Misuse.” Lamppost Productions. http://www.
lamppostproductions.com/files/articles/Scholarly%20Consensus.pdf.
54 These madhabs are the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. Madhab has been defined as “a group 
of jurists and legists who are strictly loyal to a distinct, integral and, most importantly, collective legal 
doctrine attributed to an eponym, a master-jurist, so to speak, after whom the school is known to acquire 
particular, distinctive characteristics…” Wael B. Hallaq. 2005. The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://www.hadith-studies.com/Hallaq-Origins-Evolution-
Islamic-Law.pdf., 152.
55 Abu Sulayman Hamd ibn al-Khattabi al-Busti. [N.d.] 2009. Ma’alim as-Sunan fi Sharh Sunan Abi 
Dawud. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 322. See also Ibn Abdul-Barr. [N.d.] Vol. 6, 167-168.
56 Ibid. Abu Hanifah says: ال يقتل ما هم عليه من الشرك أعظم
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insults. Since Islam takes their non-Islamic beliefs as a given and therefore overlooks 
them, no punishment is warranted for an equal or lesser offense.
According to the great Hanafi scholar Imam al-‘Ayni (d.1453), Abu Hanifah’s 
position was adopted by Imam al-Bukhari (d. 870), the compiler of the hadith collection 
popularly known as Sahih al-Bukhari.57 Al-‘Ayni inferred that this was al-Bukhari’s 
opinion from the latter’s treatment of the following hadith in his collection:
A Jew passed by Allah’s Messenger ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and said, “As-Saamu ‘Alaik.” Allah’s 
Messenger ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said in reply, “Wa ‘Alaik.” Allah’s Messenger ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص then said to 
his companions, “Do you know what he said? He said, ‘As-Saamu ‘Alaika.’” They 
said, “O Allah’s Messenger! Shall we kill him?” The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, “No. When 
the People of the Book greet you, say: ‘Wa ‘Alaikum.’”58 
The meaning of this incident lies in a play on words. The Muslim greeting is “As-Salaamu 
‘alaikum” (“Peace be upon you”). “As-Saam,” on the other hand, means “death,” and 
so the Jewish passerby was wishing death upon the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص to his face while 
also mocking the Muslim greeting. He also used the singular form of “upon you,” rather 
than the more common plural form, implying not only inappropriate familiarity but also 
specificity. When the Companions asked if they should kill the man, he merely instructed 
them to reply, “And upon you.”
Al-‘Ayni points out the significance of al-Bukhari’s putting this hadith in a chapter 
that he titled, “If a non-Muslim, or other than him, abuses the Prophet 59” .ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص In Islamic 
jurisprudence, al-Bukhari’s chapter headings, together with the hadith he placed under 
them, are considered legal rulings.60  Al-‘Ayni therefore concludes that he followed Abu 
Hanifah in overlooking such insults. He also reports that Sufyan ath-Thawri (d. 778), 
an early jurist and hadith scholar, relied on this hadith in adopting the same position61 
57 Badr ad-Din al-‘Ayni. [855] 2001. Vol. 24 of Umdat al-Qari fi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari. 25 vols. 
Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah, 121. See also Ibn Abdul-Barr. [N.d.] Vol. 6, 168.
58 Al-Bukhari. 1997, vol. 9, 48.
59 Ibid.
60 “It has been aptly remarked that the headings of the various chapters of the Sahih constitute the 
fiqh of Imam al-Bukhari.” Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi. 1993. Hadith Literature: Its Origin, Development 
and Special Features. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 53. Indeed, the derivation of al-Bukhari’s legal 
rulings from his chapter titles has developed into its own science: fiqh al-abwab. Muhammad Zakariyya 
Kandihlawi. [N.d.] Al-Abwab wat-Tarajim li Sahih al-Bukhari. Karachi: H.M. Saeed Co.
61 Al-‘Ayni [855] 2001, vol. 24, 121. Like Abu Hanifah, ath-Thawri (d. 778) was from the third 
generation of Muslims after the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. He was, as adh-Dhahabi put it, the “Commander of the 
Believers in hadith.” Muhammad ibn Ahmed adh-Dhahabi. 2001. Vol. 7 of Siyar A’lam an-Nubala. Beirut: 
Mu’asas ar-Risala, 236. Ibn Abdul-Barr describes the position of Abu Hanifah, his companions, and ath-
Thawri as: يعزر وال يقتل . Ibn Abdul-Barr. [N.d.] Vol. 6, 168.
16
 
and that he concurs with it.62 Other Hanafi scholars who held this opinion include al-
Jassas (d. 942),63 al-Quduri (d. 1037),64 al-Kasani (d. 1191),65 al-Manjabi (1287),66 and al-
Haddad (d. 1720).67
To be sure, certain madhhabs and scholars supported the death penalty in 
such cases based on the reports of about ten individuals whom the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص 
ordered executed, or whose execution he apparently approved, after he conquered 
Mecca.68  However, many scholars argued that the underlying reason here was not 
their disparagement as such.69 Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) explained that 
the Hanafis “interpret the reports of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and his Companions ordering 
executions of this sort as having been based on public welfare reasons.”70 Those reasons, 
Ibn ‘Abidin says, amounted to “sowing corruption on Earth ... and inciting the non-
believers against” the Prophet 71.ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص  That is, they were executed for insurrection and 
inciting war. Ka‘b ibn Ashraf is the individual most often cited in this connection,72 
but it is clear that he was not executed for mere insults. Ibn Kathir said about him: “He 
went to Medina, where he proclaimed his enmity and incited people to go to war. He 
had not left Mecca before he had united them to fight the Messenger of God.”73 The 
Shafi‘i hadith scholar Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (d. 1372) reports that Ka‘b “approached 
62 Al-‘Ayni [855] 2001, vol. 24, 124. Echoing Abu Hanifah, al-‘Ayni concludes: “I say: they are not 
killed because of that which is greater than [their insults], that is, polytheism.” In Arabic:  قلت لم يقتلهم بما هو 
أعظم منه وهو الشرك
63 Abu Bakr Ahmad bin Ali ar-Razi al-Jassas. 2010. Vol 6. of Sharh Mukhtasar at-Tahawi. Beirut: Dar 
al-Bashir, 142.
64 Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Quduri. 2004. Vol. 12 of At-Tajrid. Alexandria: Dar As-Salaam, 6266.
65 Masoud ibn Ahmad al-Kasani. 1986. Vol. 5 of Bada‘i as-Sana‘i fi Tartib as-Shara‘i. Dar al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyya. Beirut, 113.
66 Ali ibn Zakariya al-Manjabi. [1287] 1994. Vol. 2 of Al-Lubab fi Jama‘ bayna as-Sunnah wa al-Kitab. 
Peshawar: Maktaba Haqqaniyya, 765.
67 Abu Bakr ibn Ali al-Haddad. [1397] 2006. Vol. 1 of Al-Jawhara an-Nayira ‘ala Mukhtasar al-Quduri. 
Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 606. Al-Haddad explained: “Insulting the Prophet amounts to insulting 
God. And they already insult God by saying he has a son.”
68 Some of these reports are fabricated, as, for example, the story of the poetess ‘Asma bint Marwan. 
Hadith scholar adh-Dhahabi (d. 1348) quoted al-Bukhari and others as saying the narrator of the story is 
“rejected” and “an evil liar.” Imam Shams al-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmed adh-Dhahabi. [N.d.] Vol. 3 of 
Mizan al-I‘tidal fi Naqd ar-Rijal. Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘rifah, 509. For the conquest of Mecca, see Martin Lings. 
1983. Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources. London: Islamic Texts Society, 297-303.
69 For example, as-Subki wrote, “We know from the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and his kindness, mercy, and 
compassion that he never took revenge for himself, but only did so when the sanctities of God were violated, 
and then he took vengeance for God ... so how is vengeance taken for his sake after his death?” Taqi ad-Din 
as-Subki, As-Sayf al-Maslul, cited in Matthew Anderson. 2017. “Prophetic Models, Islamic Jurisprudence, 
and the Question of Blasphemy.” Berkley Forum, July 17. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/
prophetic-models-islamic-jurisprudence-and-the-question-of-blasphemy.
70 Quoted in Muhammad Amin Ibn ‘Abidin. 2007. Tanbih al Wulat wal Hukkam ‘ala Ahkam  Shatim 
Khair il Anam. Cairo: Dar al-Athar, 107.
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the polytheists of the Quraish and formed an alliance with them under the curtains 
of the Kaaba to fight the Muslims.”74 Ibn Hajar explains that al-Bukhari’s placement 
of this incident in a chapter on war in his Sahih signifies al-Bukhari’s interpretation 
that Ka‘b was killed for waging war against the Muslims.75 Al-‘Ayni states that Ka‘b and 
others like him “were not killed merely for their insults [of the Prophet], but rather 
it was surely because they aided [the enemy] against him, and joined with those who 
fought wars against him, and supported them.”76
Moreover, despite the threat they posed, many of those whom the Prophet 
 had ordered executed sought and were granted clemency. And as discussed in ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
more detail below, there are dozens of instances of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص overlooking 
and pardoning insults and even assaults.77 For these reasons, the Hanafis and those 
who shared their view did not find Ka‘b’s story and similar reports applicable to their 
perspective on the issue. 
Many Pakistanis who support the death penalty for non-Muslims cite Ibn al-
Bazzaz, a fourteenth-century Hanafi scholar from the Crimea. He was the first one to 
introduce this notion into Hanafi jurisprudence when, in a legal commentary, he cited 
a fatwa to this effect by Ibn Taymiyya as the most authoritative one on the issue.78 
Ibn al-Bazzaz’s opinion gained currency in subsequent years as Ottoman authorities 
promoted it in their efforts to mobilize Sunnis against their Safavid Shiite rivals.79
Two subsequent Hanafi scholars, however, definitively refuted this line of 
thinking and lamented that it had crept into the school’s jurisprudence.80 The first, 
Husam Chelebi (d. 1520), an Ottoman judge and scholar, “argued that the Ḥanafī school 
had historically been loath to impose the death penalty for insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, 
71 Ibn ‘Abidin 2007, 110.
72 Including by the Federal Shariat Court, when it held that the death penalty was mandatory for 
insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. See Muhammad Ismail Qureshi v. Pakistan 1987, 13, 16.
73 Abul-Fida Ismail Ibn Kathir. The Life of the Prophet Muhammad. Trans. Trevor Gassick. Reading: 
Garnet Publishing. Vol. 3, p. 7.
74 Ahmad ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani. 1986. Vol. 7 of Fath al-Bari fi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari. Cairo: Dar 
ar-Rayyan li at-Turath, 392.
75 Ibid., p. 397.
76 Al-‘Ayni [855] 2001, vol. 24, 121. In Arabic: من ويجمعون  عليه،  عونا  كانوا  وإنما  سبهم،  بمجرد  يقتلهم   لم 
يحاربونه، ويؤيده
77 See, for example, Mohammad Elshinawy and Omar Suleiman. 2017. “How the Prophet Muhammad 
-Rose Above Enmity and Insult.” Yaqeen Institute. https://yaqeeninstitute.org/en/mohammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
elshinawy/how-the-prophet-muhammad-%EF%B7%BA-rose-above-enmity-and-insult/.





and he identified the source of the contagion as Ibn al-Bazzaz.”81 The second scholar, 
Ibn ‘Abidin (d. 1836), expanded on Chelebi’s work and systematically deconstructed 
Ibn al-Bazzaz’s arguments, concluding that the death penalty is not mandatory in such 
a case.82  His analysis is discussed below.
Accordingly, it is clear that no ijma‘ exists about applying this specific 
punishment to non-Muslims. Moreover, although the Hanafi school was generally the 
most lenient Sunni school on this issue, there was no ijma‘ within the Shafi‘i school 
either. A significant contingent of Shafi‘is, including the great hadith scholar Imam 
an-Nawawi (d. 1277),83 held that some punishment short of death was acceptable but 
not mandatory.84  Ibn Hajar held that insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص could be overlooked 
in the interest of harmonious relations with non-Muslims.85 Indeed, ash-Shafi‘i himself 
offered divergent views on this question.86 It is also reported from at least one Hanbali 
scholar, Qadi al-Hulwani (d. 1111), that a non-Muslim who insults God and His Messenger 
 (should not be killed.87 The Yemeni scholar and reformer ash-Shawkani (d. 1839 ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
concurred with al-Asqalani that such insults could be overlooked in the interest of 
harmony.88 Given all of the above, the claim that Section 295-C’s application to non-
Muslims is grounded in ijma‘ is false.
“It is clear that no ijma‘ exists about applying this 
specific punishment to non-Muslims.”“
81 Ibid., 539.
82 Muhammad Amin Ibn ‘Abidin. 1978. Vol. 1 of Majmu’at Rasa’il Ibn ‘Abidin. Beirut: Dar Ihya’ at-
Turath al-‘Arabi, 354, cited in Mark Wagner. 2015. “The Problem of Non-Muslims Who Insult the Prophet 
Mu’ammad.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 135(3), 539.
83 An-Nawawi actually held that insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص breached a non-Muslim’s covenant with 
the Muslim authorities. However, he also held that the sovereign “may pardon him or release him for a 
ransom, as may seem to him most advantageous.” Minhaj et Talibin: A Manual of Muhammadan Law 
according to the School of Shafi‘i. 1914. Trans. E. C. Howard. London: W. Thacker and Co., 469.
84 The ikhtilaf (difference of opinion) among the Shafi‘is on this issue is discussed by Ibn Taymiyya 
(1990) in as-Sarim al-Maslul ‘ala Shatim ar-Rrasul (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-’A’riyya) and Taqi ad-Din as-
Subki (2000) in as-Sayf al-Maslul ‘ala man Sabba ar-Rasul (ed. Iyad al-Ghuj, Amman: Dar al-Fath), cited in 
Wagner 2015, 529-540.
85 Al-‘Asqalani. 1986. Vol. 11, 46.
86 Wagner 2015, 532-533.
87 Ibn Taymiyya 1990, 6, cited in Wagner 2015, 532-533.




89 “This is the situation of dhimmi, protected but subordinated Jews and Christians, throughout the 
Muslim world in the Middle Ages. It is also the situation of Jews in Byzantium and much of Western 
Europe, and of Muslims in the Christian kingdoms of Spain, in Sicily, and in the Latin Levant.” John Tolan. 
2010. “The Legal Status of Religious Minorities in the Medieval Mediterranean World: A Comparative 
Study.” In Hybride Kulturen im mittelalterlichen Europa: Vorträge und Workshops einer internationalen 
Frühlingsschule/Hybrid Cultures in Medieval Europe: Papers and Workshops of in International Spring 
School, eds. Michael Borgolte and Bernd Schneidmüller. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 141-149.
90 For a good overview of the status of the dhimmi, see Tasneem Alkiek. 2017. “Religious Minorities 
under Muslim Rule.” Yaqeen Institute. https://yaqeeninstitute.org/en/tesneem-alkiek/religious-minorities-
under-muslim-rule/. See also Anver M. Emon. 2012. “Religious Minorities and Islamic Law: Accommodation 
and the Limits of Tolerance.” In Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law: Searching for 
Common Ground? eds., M. Ellis., A.M. Emon, and B. Glahn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://
www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/users/aemon/islamic%20law%20and%20human%20rights%20-%20
religious%20pluralism.pdf, 323-243.
91 The FSC cited Ash-Shifa of Qadi Iyad, a Maliki, and as-Sarim al-Maslul of Ibn Taymiyya, a Hanbali. 
See Muhammad Ismail Qureshi v. Pakistan 1987, 18-19 and passim.
92 Burhan ad-Din al-Marghinani. 1997. Vol. 4 of Al-Hidayah fi Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi’. Karachi: 
Idarat al-Quran wal-‘Uloom al-Islamiyyah, 138.
A Non-Muslim’s Disparagement of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص Does not Violate 
the Covenant with Muslim Authorities
Pre-modern Islamic polities, similar to other imperial polities, regarded people 
of other religions as conquered subjects to be governed within the framework of a 
peace covenant (‘aqd adh-dhimma),89  which entailed paying a special tax (jizya) in return 
for certain protections and rights.90 Thus, some scholars framed the issue as whether 
a non-Muslim subject (dhimmi) who insulted the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص had severed his or her 
covenant with the Muslim authorities. When Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Court held that 
death was the only punishment for violating Section 295-C, it relied in large part upon 
non-Hanafi Islamic legal treatises to conclude that this act broke this covenant and 
exposed him or her to execution.91 
But this was not the Hanafis’ traditional view. For example, al-Marghinani, a 
twelfth-century author of an authoritative book of Hanafi jurisprudence, wrote:
We argue that insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is an expression of unbelief on [the 
dhimmi’s] part and the unbelief that he has [due to his disbelief in Islam] does 
not prevent his covenant, so his added unbelief does not remove it. His covenant 
is not terminated unless he moves over to enemy territory or the enemy subdues 
a territory and wages war against us.92 
His reasoning reflects that of Abu Hanifah, as discussed above: The non-Muslims’ 
disbelief implies such disparagement. But since their disbelief is tolerated under the 
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covenant, a fortiori their insults are, in essence, just an extension of their disbelief, 
which is already officially tolerated, and thus does not break the covenant. Likewise, 
Imam at-Tahawi (d. 933), the great Hanafi scholar of hadith and creed, allowed that a 
dhimmi’s covenant could, in theory, stipulate a specific punishment for insulting the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, but “if not stipulated it will not make shedding the blood of a non-Muslim 
permissible.”93 And Ibn ‘Abidin stated: “The authoritative opinion in our school ... is 
that the dhimmi’s covenant is not nullified by cursing the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص ... The view that 
his covenant is breached is contrary to the school’s opinion, namely, the dominant 
opinion stated in the legal manuals and commentaries.”94  To be sure, an opinion does 
exist within the Hanafi school that execution is a potential penalty for certain offenses 
that do not breach this covenant.95 The point here is that the Hanafi school does not 
consider insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص a breach of this covenant, such that he or she is 
deemed an enemy at war with the Muslims and thus can be killed. 
In any event, the dhimmi rules are of dubious relevance to this issue under 
Pakistani law, given that Pakistan conceives of itself not as a pre-modern imperial 
polity but as a nation state operating on a model of equal citizenship. Thus, its non-
Muslim citizens are not dhimmis96 and are to be dealt with according to an entirely 
different jurisprudence.97  Accordingly, the non-Hanafi Islamic law treatises relied on 
by the Federal Shariat Court have no bearing on the issue of Pakistan’s application of 
Section 295-C to its non-Muslim citizens, insofar as these treatises require the death 
penalty on the basis of the non-Muslim’s dhimmi status.
For the Hanafis, There is no Hadd Punishment for a Non-Muslim who 
Disparages the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
As noted above in Chapter 2, the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan held in 1990 
that insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص “comes within the purview of hadd and the punishment 
of death provided in the Holy Quran and Sunnah cannot be altered.”98 What does hadd 
mean, and why does it matter whether insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is a hadd offense?
93 At-Tahawi. 1997. Vol. 5 of Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-‘Ulama. Beirut: Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiya, 505.
94 Ibn ‘Abidin 2007, 105.
95 Ibid.
96 Article 25(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan states: “All citizens are equal before [the] law and are 
entitled to equal protection of [the] law.”
97 See, e.g., Abdallah bin Bayyah. 2016. The Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim 
Majority Communities. http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/Files/Booklet-eng.pdf, 12. See also pages 16-
17 of Abdal Hakim Murad, “Quranic Truth and the Meaning of ‘Dhimma.’” Kalam Research & Media. 
https://www.kalamresearch.com/pdf/dhimma_final.pdf




The hadd (pl. hudud) are “a series of fixed, mandatory criminal sanctions” 
specified in the Quran and Sunnah, the foundational sources of Islamic law.99 The 
term refers to “both the major crimes and their associated punishments in Islamic 
criminal law.”100 As these laws are deemed to have been revealed by God, humans are 
“barred from making or altering these laws...”101 Moreover, “[i]n the case of crimes of 
hudud, when the crime has been established, it is mandatory for the judge to award the 
punishment decreed for such a crime, without diminishing or adding to it.”102
The Federal Shariat Court relied primarily on non-Hanafi treatises to rule that 
insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is a hadd offense. Moreover, most of the Hanafi authorities 
cited by the court who held that a non-Muslim’s insult could be punished at all noted 
that the offense was from the category of ta‘zir (censure, reprimand), which refers to 
acts described in the Quran and Sunnah as sinful actions rather than as legal offenses. 
Such offenses are deemed to pose a lesser threat to public safety than the hudud.103 
“Unspecified crimes meant unspecified sanctions, and such offenses were typically 
handled case by case—similar to common law crimes and punishments that took shape 
through the tremendous discretion of early Anglo-American judges in both definitions 
of crimes and decisions to punish.”104 In the case of ta‘zir, the judge has the discretion 
to select from a range of punishments or to forgo punishment altogether, based on the 
need for deterrence,105 the ruler’s policy preferences (siyasa), and the public interest 
(maslaha).106 
The range of available ta‘zir punishments includes a frown of disapproval, verbal 
chastisement, imprisonment, whipping, and exile.107 According to Ibn Taymiyya, such 
a punishment may consist of “an infliction of some pain on a man by word or action or 
99 Intisar A. Rabb. 2011. “The Islamic Rule of Lenity: Judicial Discretion and Legal Canons.” Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 44 (1299), 1316.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 1323.
102 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omar Sherif, and Kate Daniels, eds. 2003. Criminal Justice in 
Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari‘a. London: I.B. Tauris, 19.
103 Abdel Haleem et al., 2003, 70-71. See also Peters, Rudolf. 2005. Crime and Punishment in Islamic 
Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 54.
104 Intisar A. Rabb. 2015. Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic 
Criminal Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 35.
105 Peters 2005.
106 Rabb 2015.
107 ‘Abdul-Hayy al-Lucknawi. [N.d.] Al-Qawl al-Jazim fi Saqut al-Hadd bi Nikah al-Maharim. 
Lucknow: Matba’ Yusufi, 35-36.
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by avoiding saying a good word to him or doing a good deed for him. It may be by harsh 
admonition or reproach; it may be by forsaking him and neglecting to salute him until 
he repents…by imprisonment, by beating, by daubing the face black or making the 
guilty ride backwards on a donkey.”108 Ibn ‘Abidin notes that in the Hanafi school, the 
range of discretionary punishments may also include death if the ruler believes that it 
will serve the public welfare.109 At the same time, unlike hadd offenses, taz’ir offenses 
are amenable to intercession and pardon.110
Imam at-Tahawi wrote: “And whoever [insulted the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص] from the 
people of the covenant, then verily he is disciplined but not killed.”111 The Maliki scholar 
Qadi Iyad (d. 1149) attributes to the Hanafi madhab (and to ath-Thawri) the view that 
non-Muslims who insult the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص are not to be executed, but “chastised and 
given a ta‘zir punishment.”112 Ibn ‘Abidin relates the opinion of the twelfth-century 
hadith scholar Ibn al-Mu’ayyid, who held that such offenders could be executed “but 
are not, since it is not a matter of [enforcing] a hadd offense, but rather [a matter of] 
public policy (siyasa); it is left to the ruler to enforce if he finds that it would promote 
the common welfare (maslaha).”113 Ibn ‘Abidin agreed that the death penalty was an 
option, but that if he or she “is merely punished, that would not be contrary to the 
opinion of the school.”114 Ibn Taymiyya describes the Hanafi position in similar terms: 
The non-Muslim offender is not killed, “although he can be punished for making [his 
blasphemy] public…”115 Like the Hanafis, ash-Shafi‘i held that insulting the Prophet 
 does not reach the level of a hadd crime.”116“ ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
108 Ahmad ibn ‘Abdul-Halim ibn Taymiyya. [N.d.] 2000. Ibn Taymiyya on Public and Private Law 
in Islam, or Public Policy in Islamic Jurisprudence. Trans. Omar A. Farrukh. Al-Khobar: New National 
Publishers & Distributors, 128-29.
109 Ibn ‘Abidin 2007, 108.
110 Abul-Hasan Ali ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi. [N.d.] 1996. Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyah: The Laws of 
Islamic Governance. Trans. Asadullah Yate. London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 10-11.
111 Abu Bakr al-Jassas. 2010. Vol. 6 of Sharh Mukhtasar at-Tahawi. Beirut: Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiya, 
142. In Arabic: ومن كان من ذلك من أهل الذمة: فإنه يؤدب وال يقتل
112 Quoted in Ibn ‘Abidin 2007, 104.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid, 110.
115 Ibn Taymiyya 1990, cited in Ibn ‘Abidin 2007, 107.




Hadd avoidance: The “doubt canon”
As demonstrated above, there is considerable disagreement (ikhtilaf) among 
Islamic legal authorities as to whether this act is a hadd or a ta‘zir offense. Indeed the 
more well-known Hanafi position is that such insults are not punishable offenses or 
are, at most, ta‘zir. Under these circumstances, the legal principle of hadd avoidance 
counsels against the death penalty in such cases. The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:
 اْدَرُءوا اْلُحُدوَد َعْن اْلُمْسلِِميَن َما اْستَطَْعتُْم فَإِْن َكاَن لَهُ َمْخَرٌج فََخلُّوا َسبِيلَهُ فَإِنَّ
َماَم أَْن يُْخِطَئ فِي اْلَعْفِو َخْيٌر ِمْن أَْن يُْخِطَئ فِي اْلُعقُوبَِة اإْلِ
Avoid applying the hudud upon the Muslims as much as you can. If the criminal 
has a way out, then leave him to his way. Verily, it is better for the leader to 
make a mistake forgiving the criminal than it is for him to make a mistake 
punishing the innocent.117 
Based upon this and similar hadith, as well as statements from the Companions 
and policy considerations derived from the canonical texts, from the earliest years of 
Islamic history Muslim jurists have sought to avoid punishing the accused whenever 
possible, seeing excessive punishment “both as a moral wrong for which they might 
be accountable if they authorized it and as a means of social control that shifted power 
from them to the ruling authorities.”118 To this end, they elucidated what has been 
referred to as the “doubt canon.” According to the formulation of Abu Hanifah’s two 
most illustrious students, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad ash-Shaybani, this canon is idra’u 
‘l-hudud bi’l-shubahat (“avoid imposing criminal sanctions [hudud] in cases of doubt”).119 
The doubt canon was invoked to avoid hudud punishment in cases where, 
for example, the evidence against the accused was unclear or where the law was 
ambiguous or not well-known. It was also used to avoid hudud punishment when there 
was some question as to whether the offense fell under the category of hudud or ta‘zir. 
117 Sunan at-Tirmidhi 1424.




The common good (maslaha) is not served by applying Pakistan’s 
blasphemy law to non-Muslims
As mentioned above, the scholars of Islamic law explained that ta‘zir offenses 
were “punishable at the discretion of a judge or caliphal official according to the policy 
preferences of the political authority (siyasa) if certain acts constituted behavior that 
threatened to compromise public order or the public interest (maslaha), which the 
caliph was charged with upholding.”121 To understand how authorities should approach 
a given ta‘zir offense, then, one must understand the concepts of siyasa and maslaha.
The great Maliki legal theorist Shihab ad-Din al-Qarafi (d. 1285) described siyasa, 
usually translated as “policy preferences,” as “that power entrusted to the government 
to improve society. Exercises of this power were valid insofar as they were undertaken 
with the purpose of enhancing the community’s welfare and did so improve it in 
fact.”122 Siyasa laws “were not extrapolated from scripture by religious legal scholars, 
but rather crafted by Muslim rulers according to their own philosophies of government 
and ideas about how best to maintain public order.”123
In Arabic, maslaha means “a cause or source of something good and beneficial. 
In English it is frequently rendered as ‘public interest,’ although it is much closer in 
meaning to well-being, welfare, and social weal.”124 In the view of Islamic jurists, it is 
“the embodiment of the purpose of the law.”125 The Hanafi jurist Abu Bakr al-Jassas is 
For example, in the view of the illustrious Hanafi jurist Ahmad al-Quduri (d. 1037), 
“the very fact of different juristic opinions as to whether [an offense] fell under the 
technical definition of [a hadd crime] automatically required avoidance of the hadd 
punishment, for fear that it would not be authorized by God.”120 In light of the manifest 
diversity of opinion as to whether insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is a hadd or ta‘zir offense, 
or even whether it should be overlooked altogether, the principle of hadd avoidance 
counsels against treating it as a hadd offense that mandates the death penalty.
120 Ibid., 178.
121 Rabb 2015, 35 note 40, citing al-Mawardi. [N.d.] 1978. Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyya. Ed. Muhammad 
Fahmi as-Sirjani.  Cairo: al-Maktaba at-Tawfīqiyya, 250, 266-69; and al-Mawardi. [N.d.] Vol. 2 of Kitab al-
Hudud min al-Hawi, 1022.
122 Asifa Quraishi-Landes. 2015. “The Sharia Problem with Sharia Legislation.” Ohio Northern 
University Law Review 41(16) 545, 551.
123 Ibid., 550.





one of the earliest scholars to reference the concept.126 Its most well-known elucidator 
was the Shafi‘i jurist Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, who argued that maslaha was the underlying 
purpose of the divine law. In practice, according to him, this term means to preserve 
for all of humanity “the five essentials of their well-being,”127 namely, religion, life, 
intellect, property, and lineage.128  When a law fails to protect these essential elements, 
it produces mafsada,129 which the Tunisian scholar Ibn Ashur (d. 1973) defined as “an 
attribute of the act whereby corruption or harm happens always or mostly to the public 
or individuals.”130 As the great Hanbali jurist Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350) explained, any 
matter that abandons maslaha for mafsada is, by definition, not from the divine law.131  
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the determinative question is whether 
Pakistan achieves maslaha by applying its blasphemy law to non-Muslims. The clear 
answer is that it does not. Rather, it produces mafsada in the form of chaos and 
oppression, harm to Islam’s reputation, and even more blasphemy.
The determinative question is, does Pakistan achieve 
Maslaha by applying its blasphemy law to non-Muslims?“
126 Ahmad b. ‘Ali al-Jassas. 1981. al-Fusul fil-Usul. Lahore: al-Maktaba al-‘Ilmiyya, 133-135, 
cited in Opwis 2005, 188, and note 21.
127 Opwis 2005, 188.
128 Muhammad at-Tahir ibn Ashur. 2006. Treatise on Maqasid ash-Shari’ah. Trans. Mohamed El-Tahir 
El-Mesawi. Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 118.
129 Opwis 2005, 188.
130 Ibn Ashur 2005, 96.
131 Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr az-Zar’iyy (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya). 1991. Vol. 3 of I‘lam al-Muwaqqi‘in 
‘an Rabb al-‘Alamin. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 11.
132 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State 2015, 17.
Pakistan’s application of blasphemy laws
to non-Muslims promotes chaos
Section 295-C of Pakistan’s criminal code derives from and contributes to the 
widespread misunderstanding that Islam categorically ordains the death penalty for 
non-Muslims who insult the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and, as such, helps create an environment 
that legitimizes mob violence against the accused. Thus Mumtaz Qadri, who assassinated 
Governor Salman Taseer, argued before the Supreme Court of Pakistan that he “was under 
a religious and moral, and hence legal, obligation to kill an apostate who had committed 
the offence of blasphemy, particularly when the State had failed to take any legal action 
against the offender.”132 The court’s rejoinder was telling: If this were to be accepted 
as a mitigating circumstance, “then a door shall become open for religious vigilantism 
which may deal a mortal blow to the rule of law in this country where divergent religious 
interpretations abound and tolerance stands depleted to an alarming level.”133 
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The court was right but did not go far enough: The threat to the rule of law in the 
country lies not merely in accepting a religious justification for vigilante murder, but in 
the existence of the blasphemy law itself. The correlation between the law’s existence 
and the breakdown of respect for authority is demonstrated by the fact that before it 
was passed, only two extrajudicial murders associated with blasphemy allegations had 
been reported. In contrast, since its passage there have been fifty-seven such murders, 
most of them of members of religious minority communities.134 The situation has 
worsened since the Federal Shariat Court’s 1990 determination that the death penalty 
is mandatory for violations of Section 295-C, given “the implicit sanction it grants 
extremist elements ... to themselves inflict the penalty through vigilante justice if the 
court does not deliver according to their wishes … [L]egal sanction for death to the 
accused is an added impetus to their taking the law into their own hands.”135
When individuals are accused, “courts and authorities are frequently 
overruled by Pakistani citizens engaging in vigilantism to bring justice upon alleged 
blasphemers” before any legal processes can even begin.136 Police often make arrests 
“in order to appease violent mobs who storm the neighborhoods and homes of accused 
blasphemers.”137 As noted earlier, one supposedly religious group literally threatened 
to unleash “anarchy” if Asia Bibi were pardoned.138 Politicians and judges are also 
frequent targets of violence and intimidation in connection with blasphemy laws.139 
This includes Salman Taseer as well as Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, who was 
assassinated by the Pakistani Taliban for working to reform these laws.140 Government 
officials like these are targeted because of the popular notion that, as Mumtaz Qadri 
argued, “it is not just defiling the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) which constitutes blasphemy but criticizing the law regarding blasphemy is 
also blasphemous.”141 The blasphemy laws have thus created:
133 Ibid.
134 Arafat Mazhar. 2015. “Why blasphemy remains unpardonable in Pakistan.” Dawn. February 19. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1163596.
135 Siddique 2008, 383.
136 Matt Hoffman. 2014. “Modern Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan and the Rimsha Masih Case: What 
Effect—if Any—the Case Will Have on Their Future Reform.” Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 13 (2) 371, 383.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., note 2.
139 Ibid.
140 Declan Walsh. 2011. “Pakistan minister Shahbaz Bhatti shot dead in Islamabad.” The Guardian. 
March 2. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/02/pakistan-minister-shot-dead-islamabad.
141 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State. 2015, 23.
The existence of the blasphemy law itself is a threat to 
the rule of law in Pakistan.“
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this informal system whereby vigilantism wins out in the arena of blasphemy law 
enforcement—where arrests are made based on popular pressure and protests, 
punishment is handed down in the street more often than in the courtroom, and 
politicians, on fear of assassination, feel constrained to maintain the status quo—
has created a system of governance in Pakistan that exists and operates outside 
of the realm of the government’s control, and outside of the rule of law.142 
Under Islamic law, this state of affairs is totally unacceptable. As the Maliki 
scholar al-Qurtubi (d. 1273) stated in his magisterial exegesis of the Quran, “there 
is no dispute among the scholars that all criminal punishments, such as execution, 
cannot be carried out except by those in authority who are obliged to carry out the 
... hadd punishments, etc.”143 Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) said that ijma‘ has been reached on 
this matter,144 and Allamah al-Kasani al-Hanafi likewise confirmed, “The only one who 
implements criminal punishment is the ruler or the one the ruler has appointed for 
this duty.”145  The Hanbali Ibn Rajab (d. 1393) said, “It is not permissible to transgress 
the authorities or take authority into one’s hands, even if the authorities themselves 
are falling short in fulfilling their responsibilities.”146  The Egyptian Shafi‘i scholar Abu 
Bakr ad-Dimyati (d. 1893) said that if anyone other than the authorities kills a criminal, 
“then he will be punished for transgressing against the authorities.”147
Accordingly, those who take it upon themselves to kill alleged blasphemers are 
sinful corrupters because their action creates an atmosphere of chaos and disrespect for 
the law, which contributes to the breakdown of public order—a condition which is far 
worse than the harm caused by the alleged blasphemy. As Imam al-Ghazali wrote, when 
government authority breaks down “the world will undoubtedly become ruined and 
religion and the world will suffer injury and damage.”148  The current situation is a source 
of tremendous public disorder. It is, therefore, a source of mafsada rather than maslaha.
142 Hoffman 201, 383.
143 Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad al-Qurtubi. 2006. Vol. 3 of Al-Jami‘ li Ahkam al-Quran. Beirut: 
Mu’assasah Risalah, 66. al-Qurtubi’s remarks occur in his explanation of Surah al-Baqarah 2:178. While 
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punishments as well. See, for example, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, General Presidency of Scholarly Research 
and Ifta’. [N.d.] No. 2095 of Fatwas of the Permanent Committee (holding that a stipulation in a tribal 
settlement imposing a fine is forbidden “because such a fine is a financial discretionary punishment [ta’zir]” 
and “such a punishment is to be decided only by judges.”).
144 Ibn Rushd said: “They agreed that the person who applies this hadd is the imam as is the case in all 
other hudud.” Abdallah al-Abadi. 1995. Sharh Bidayah al-Mujtahid wan-Nihayah al-Muqtasid. Beirut: Dar 
as-Salam, 2259.
145 Alauddin Abi Bakr bin Mas‘ud al-Kasani al-Hanafi. 1986. Vol. 7 of Bada‘i as-Sana‘i fi Tartib ash-
Shara‘i, 57.
146 Abul-Faraj Zayn-ud-Deen ‘Abdur-Rahman ibn Ahmad ibn Rajab. 2002. Vol. 2 of Majmu‘ ar-Rasa’il. 
Cairo: al-Faruq al-Hadithah lit-Tiba‘ah wan-Nashr, 608.
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Pakistan’s application of blasphemy laws
to non-Muslims results in oppression
As the Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed, “The majority of blasphemy 
cases are based on false accusations stemming from property issues or other personal 
or family vendettas rather than genuine instances of blasphemy and they inevitably 
lead to mob violence against the entire community.”149 Thus, “procedural issues, the 
propensity for misuse of blasphemy laws for mala fide purposes, the social and political 
pressures that impede the objective and fair adjudication of blasphemy cases, and the 
vulnerability of the accused, especially if they belong to a minority, further confound 
and aggravate the situation.”150 
Moreover, the number of registered cases under Section 295-C has increased 
sharply since the Federal Shariat Court declared death the only possible sentence. Thus, 
it is clear, “based on a review of the nature of allegations made in these cases and their 
eventual verdicts, that the death sentence has increased the potency of Section 295-C 
as an instrument for victimization.”151 As the Lahore High Court observed in a recent 
judgment, this increase “shows that the law was being abused ... to settle ... scores.”152 
A disturbing number of those accused of blasphemy are children and the 
mentally disabled.153 For example Rimsha Masih, a fourteen-year-old mentally 
disabled Christian girl, was arrested and charged with blasphemy in 2012.154 Salamat 
Masih, Rehmat Masih, and Manzoor Masih, all thirteen-year-old Christian boys, were 
sentenced to death in 1995 for supposedly writing offensive words on a mosque wall. 
The sentences of Salamat and Rehmat were overturned for lack of evidence, while 
extremists murdered Manzoor during his trial.155
Amnesty International has meticulously documented how Pakistan’s blasphemy 
laws have been used as a tool of injustice and oppression. Some of their findings are 
presented below:
147 Abu Bakr Uthman b. Muhammad Shata al-Bakri ad-Dimyati. 1995. Vol. 4 of I’anat at-Talibin ala 
Hill Alfadh Fath al-Mu’in. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 157.
148 Ann K. S. Lambton. 1981. State and Government in Medieval Islam. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 124, translated from al-Ghazali. 1972. Nasihat al-Muluk, ed. Jalal ed-Din Huma’i. Tehran: Anjuman-i 
Asar-i Milli, 131-132.
149 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State 2015, 26.
150 Siddique 2008, 335.
151 Ibid., 342.
152 Ibid.
153 Amnesty International. 2016. “As Good as Dead: The Impact of the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan.” 
December 21. http://www.refworld.org/docid/585a41704.html, 12.
154 Ibid.
155 Siddique 2008, 329.
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Many people accused of blasphemy are forced to undergo a gruelling trial due to 
several factors: vaguely formulated laws, the low standard of evidence required for 
conviction, and the manner in which allegations are often uncritically accepted 
by the police, the prosecuting authorities, and even trial court judges, who may 
themselves also face threats and intimidation... 
There are frequent reports of the lack of independence by trial courts and sometimes 
even high courts, largely due to pressure exerted by complainants or others in 
support of the law. The accused are often presumed guilty and the burden is on 
them to prove their innocence rather than on the prosecution to prove their “guilt” 
beyond reasonable doubt...
Many individuals have been convicted of blasphemy on the basis of a standard 
of proof below that of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is particularly the case 
with charges filed under Section 295-C, because an individual can be convicted 
and sentenced to death solely on the basis of oral testimonies of a few prosecution 
witnesses.156 
In sum, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are “a potent tool for the victimization of 
religious minorities and relegation of these minorities, in many instances, to the status 
of fearful pariahs subject to legally mandated persecution.”157 This is a shameful state 
of affairs, given that Pakistan’s constitution declares that the principles of “tolerance 
and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.” In this connection, 
the Quran tells Muslims:
And:
قُْل أََمَر َربِّي بِاْلقِْسِط
Say: “My Lord has commanded justice.”158 
ْحَساِن َوإِيتَاِء ِذي اْلقُْربَٰى َ يَأُْمُر بِاْلَعْدِل َواإْلِ إِنَّ للاَّ
َويَْنَهٰى َعِن اْلفَْحَشاِء َواْلُمنَكِر َواْلبَْغِي ۚ يَِعظُُكْم لََعلَُّكْم تََذكَُّروَن
Verily, Allah orders justice and good conduct, and giving to relatives, and forbids all 
shameful deeds and bad conduct and oppression. He admonishes you that perhaps you 
will be reminded.159 
156 Amnesty International 2016, 12.
157 Siddique 2008, 306.
158 Quran, Surah al-A‘raf 7:29
159 Quran, Surah an-Nahl 16:90
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Likewise, it is as if those who claim to love the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص have forgotten his warning:
And the Messenger of Allah ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:
It is inconceivable that Muslims could truly love Allah and His Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص while lying 
about their neighbors in order to pursue petty grudges and vendettas. And yet this 
very practice is clearly rampant. The Quran warns such people:
Perhaps those who oppress their neighbors justify their actions to themselves 
on the grounds that their victims are not Muslim. This excuse is patently bogus for all 
Muslims who understand their religion. All of these verses and hadith apply to non-
Muslims just as much as they do to Muslims. As the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said regarding the non-
Muslims living in peace with the Muslims:
ْمُت الظُّْلَم ِ تَبَاَرَك َوتََعالَى أَنَّهُ قَاَل يَا ِعبَاِدي إِنِّي َحرَّ َعْن للاَّ
ًما فََل تَظَالَُموا َعلَى نَْفِسي َوَجَعْلتُهُ بَْينَُكْم ُمَحرَّ
Allah the Exalted said: “O my servants, I have forbidden oppression for Myself 
and have made it forbidden among you, so do not oppress one another.”161 
ِ َولَْو َعلَٰى أَنفُِسُكْم أَِو اْلَوالَِدْيِن اِميَن بِاْلقِْسِط ُشَهَداَء ِلَّ  يَا أَيَُّها الَِّذيَن آَمنُوا ُكونُوا قَوَّ
ُ أَْولَٰى بِِهَما فََل تَتَّبُِعوا اْلَهَوٰى أَن تَْعِدلُوا َوإِن  َواْلَْقَربِيَن إِن يَُكْن َغنِيًّا أَْو فَقِيًرا فَالَّ
َ َكاَن بَِما تَْعَملُوَن َخبِيًرا تَْلُووا أَْو تُْعِرُضوا فَإِنَّ للاَّ
O you who believe, be those who persistently stand firm in justice as witnesses for Allah, 
even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives. Whether one is rich or poor, 
Allah is more worthy of both. Follow not your desires, lest you not be just. If you distort 
your testimony or refuse to give it, then Allah is aware of what you do.162 
160 Abu al-Qasim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad at-Tabarani. 2016. Vol. 2 of Al-Mu‘ jam al-Kabir. Islamabad: 
Millat Publications, 2016, 808.
161 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. 2007, vol. 6, 444.
162 Quran, Surah an-Nisa’ 4:135.
اتَّقُوا َدْعَوةَ اْلَمْظلُوِم فَإِنََّها تُْحَمُل َعلَى اْلَغَماِم
تِي َوَجللِي لَْنُصَرنََّك َولَْو بَْعَد ِحيٍن ُ َجلَّ َجللُهُ َوِعزَّ يَقُوُل للاَّ
Beware of the supplication of the oppressed, for it is carried above the clouds. Allah 




It is thus apparent that a statute like Section 295-C, whose design and application 
unquestionably results in the widespread unjust persecution of officially protected 
people, is a source of harm and corruption (mafsada) rather than of maslaha.
ةُ َرُسولِِه فَقَْد أَْخفََر ِ َوِذمَّ أاَلَ َمْن قَتََل نَْفًسا ُمَعاِهَدةً لَهُ ِذمَّةُ للاَّ
ِ فَلَ يََرْح َرائَِحةَ اْلَجنَِّة َوإِنَّ ِريَحَها لَيُوَجُد ِمْن َمِسيَرِة َسْبِعيَن َخِريفًا ِة للاَّ بِِذمَّ
Indeed, whoever kills one who has a covenant from Allah and a covenant from 
His Messenger, then he has violated the covenant with Allah and the covenant of 
His Messenger. So he shall not smell the fragrance of Paradise, even though its 
fragrance can be sensed from the distance of seventy autumns.163 
أاََل َمْن ظَلََم ُمَعاِهًدا أَْو اْنتَقََصهُ أَْو َكلَّفَهُ فَْوَق طَاقَتِِه
أَْو أََخَذ ِمْنهُ َشْيئًا بَِغْيِر ِطيِب نَْفٍس فَأَنَا َحِجيُجهُ يَْوَم اْلقِيَاَمِة
No doubt, if anyone wrongs one with a covenant, violates his rights, burdens him 
with more work than he is able to do, or takes something from him without his 
consent, then I will be his advocate on the Day of Resurrection.164 
163 Abu ‘Isa Muhammad ibn ‘Isa at-Tirmidhi. 2007. Vol. 3 of Jami‘ at-Tirmidhi. Riyadh: Darussalaam, 
189.
164 Abu Dawud Sulayman ibn al-Ash‘ath al-Azdi as-Sijistani. 2008. Vol. 3 of Sunan Abu Dawud. 
Riyadh: Darussalaam, 527.
165 Kenneth Baxter Wolf. 1988. Christian Martyrs in Muslim Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 97.
166 Ibid.
167 Adriano Duque. 2011. “Claiming Martyrdom in the Episode of The Martyrs of Córdoba [Reivindicación 
del martirio en el episodio de los mártires de Córdoba]. ” Collectanea Christiana Orientalia 8, 28-29.
Pakistan’s application of blasphemy laws to non-Muslims encourages 
blasphemy and harms Islam’s reputation
Between 850 and 859, forty-eight Christians living in the Cordoba caliphate 
presented themselves before Muslim religious officials, denounced Islam and the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and, pursuant to the predominant Maliki school of law, were executed. 
The actions of these “Martyrs of Cordoba” were “deliberate and provocative, specifically 
designed to bring about [their] own death.”165 They “came forward, unsummoned and 
without any pressure to forsake their religion, to denounce Islam in deliberate violation 
of the laws against blasphemy.”166 Their actions “indicated a deliberate knowledge and 
use of the legal procedures in place, in order to legitimize his/her own death.”167 Why 
did they do it?
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[T]he martyrs seem to have hoped to be able to provide successive martyrdoms 
until every Christian in Spain should be so roused against the [Muslims] that he 
would rise up in rebellion and begin the final Messianic war, during the course of 
which, they believed, God would intervene, destroy the Arab regime in Spain, and 
bring history to its End....
By forcing the [Muslim] regime to execute Christian martyr after Christian martyr, 
they hoped so to discredit that regime and so to enrage against it the very elements 
they hoped to win back to Christianity, that these elements would return openly to 
Christianity, and, in alliance with the moderate Christians now similarly enraged, 
would follow the martyrs’ example in being willing to die for the faith.168 
Moreover, they perceived voluntary martyrdom as a way to achieve spiritual 
heights unattainable through ordinary worship. Many “had received the sacrament 
of penance as a means of intensifying their asceticism and ... martyrdom was a final 
expression of their penitential anxiety.”169 
Recognizing that he had a voluntary martyrdom movement on his hands, Cordoba’s 
emir issued an edict promising the death penalty for any future blasphemers. Critically, 
however, this “was not a well-conceived deterrent” because Christians were attracted 
by the martyrs’ example and it thus “opened the door to waves of imitators, many of 
whom recognized the act of martyrdom as the perfect realization and culmination of 
their penitential programs.”170 The martyrs were able to use “Islamic legal practice as 
a theoretical and jurisprudential legitimization of orthodox [Christian] power” and “to 
communicate a strategic message and to legitimize the existence of the religious group 
they represent[ed].”171 The judge became “the agent that ... recognize[d] the role of the 
martyr as a negative reflection of Islam and a depositary of Christian faith.”172 
In 2006, over a millennium later, several Danish imams toured the Middle East to 
publicize a Danish newspaper’s publication of cartoons mocking the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. The 
result was violence around the world, including attacks on churches and Christians 
that resulted in at least fifty deaths in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.173 In Pakistan, 
five people were killed in one week,174 including an eight-year old boy who died when 
168 Allan Harris Cutler. 1965. “The Ninth-Century Spanish Martyrs’ Movement and the Origins of 
Western Christian Missions to the Muslims.” The Muslim World 55, 330.
169 Jessica A. Coope. 1995. The Martyrs of Córdoba: Community and Family Conflict in an Age of Mass 
Conversion. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 71.
170 Wolf 1988, 25, 118.
171 Duque 2011, 48
172 Ibid., 41-42.




a protester accidentally fired into a crowd and a man who was killed when protesters 
downed power lines.175 
In solidarity with the newspaper, publications and websites around the world 
reproduced the cartoons, and the creators of the American animated television series 
South Park produced an episode in which the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was depicted in a bear suit. 
One of the show’s characters says in a monologue: “Freedom of speech is at stake here, 
don’t you all see? If anything, we should all make cartoons of Mohammed and show the 
terrorists and the extremists that we are all united in the belief that every person has 
a right to say what they want.”176
In reaction to this, a young American convert posted threats against the show’s 
creators on an extremist website that he helped operate.177 These threats received a 
great deal of media coverage, and the series’ creators were widely praised for standing 
up for freedom of speech. In fact, May 20, 2010, was designated “Everybody Draw 
Muhammad Day.” The event’s Facebook page garnered over 100,000 members.178 In 
support of this effort, the libertarian journal Reason sponsored an “Everybody Draw 
Mohammed Contest.” According to the editor, 
The ground of Europe and Asia and all the continents ... is fertilized with the 
blood and bones of martyrs who have done nothing more than make tangible 
their thoughts in words, music, and pictures. 
There comes a point in any society’s existence where it must ultimately, to 
paraphrase Martin Luther ... dig in its heels and say here we stand, we will do no 
other ... And at the heart of the liberal project is ... the right to expression … [N]o 
one should be beaten or killed or imprisoned simply for speaking their mind ... If 
we cannot or will not defend that principle with a full throat, then we deserve to 
choke on whatever jihadists of all stripes can force down our throats.
Our Draw Mohammed contest is not a frivolous exercise ... It’s a defense of what is 
at the core of a society that is painfully incompetent at delivering on its promise of 
freedom, tolerance, and equal rights. It’s a rebuttal to the notion that we should go 
limp in the clinches precisely because bullies and bastards can punch or blow us up.179 
174 Salman Masood. 2006. “Pakistan’s Violent Protests over Cartoons Take a Political Turn.” The New 
York Times. February 16. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/16/world/asia/pakistans-violent-protests-over-
cartoons-take-a-political-turn.html.
175 David Montero. 2006. “Pakistani riots about more than cartoons.” The Christian Science Monitor. 
February 17. https://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0217/p01s02-wosc.html.
176 “Cartoon Wars: Part 1.” 2006. South Park April 6. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0786244/quotes.
177 Carol Cratty. 2011. “Man who threatened ‘South Park’ creators gets 25 years in prison.” CNN. 
February 24.  http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/02/24/virginia.terror.sentence/index.html?hpt=Sbin.
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These two examples demonstrate that attempts to prevent such insults with 
violence can, and often do, have precisely the opposite effect: They encourage and 
multiply such insults. The reason, apparent in Cordoba and the modern West, is that a 
policy and practice of violence against non-Muslims accused of disparaging the Prophet 
 provides would-be “martyrs” and their supporters a platform to demonstrate the ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
alleged nobility, reasonableness, and universality of their own beliefs as against the 
harshness and intolerance of Muslims. 
There is no evidence of any such motivation among those from Pakistan’s 
religious minorities charged with insulting the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. In fact, as shown 
above, the evidence suggests that such charges are usually fabricated to settle petty 
personal grievances. But the reality of Pakistan’s application of its blasphemy laws to 
non-Muslims is a critical part of the broader, global narrative that Muslims mistreat 
religious minorities.180 This narrative is what the above-mentioned contest sponsors 
and many others sought to challenge with their profane depictions. In other words, 
by making non-Muslims legally liable for such insults, Pakistan only helps achieve the 
opposite of what the law intends. 
Precisely to avoid this sad state of affairs, Islam prohibits Muslims from doing 
or saying anything that might prompt non-Muslims to insult Islam. The Quran states:
Do not insult those they call upon besides Allah, lest they, out of spite, insult Allah without 
knowledge. In this way, We make the actions of every nation seem attractive to them. 
Then they will return to their Lord, and He will inform them about what they did.181 
Ibn Kathir, the great student of Ibn Taymiyya, said about this verse:
Allah prohibits His Messenger and the believers from insulting the false gods of 
the idolaters, although there is a clear benefit in doing so. Insulting their gods will 
lead to a bigger evil than its benefit, for the idolaters might retaliate by insulting 
the God of the believers, Allah, none has the right to be worshipped but He ... On 
this same subject—abandoning what carries benefit to avert a greater evil—it is 
recorded in the Sahih that the Messenger of Allah said:
178 Jenny Yuen. 2010. “Draw Mohammed Drawing in Fans, Foes.” Toronto Sun. May 20.http://www.
torontosun.com/news/torontoandgta/2010/05/20/14026241.html.
179 Nick Gillespie. 2010. “Why We’re Having an Everybody Draw Mohammed Contest on Thursday 
May 20.” Hit and Run Blog. May 18. http://reason.com/blog/2010/05/18/get-ready-for-everyone-draw-mo.
َ َعْدًوا بَِغْيِر ِعْلٍم ِ فَيَُسبُّوا للاَّ َواَل تَُسبُّوا الَِّذيَن يَْدُعوَن ِمن ُدوِن للاَّ
ْرِجُعُهْم فَيُنَبِّئُُهم بَِما َكانُوا يَْعَملُوَن  ٍة َعَملَُهْم ثُمَّ إِلَٰى َربِِّهم مَّ لَِك َزيَّنَّا لُِكلِّ أُمَّ َكَذٰ
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Cursed is he who insults his own parents!
They asked, “O Allah’s Messenger! And how would a man insult his own parents?” He replied,
He insults a man’s father, and that man insults his father,
and insults his mother and that man insults his mother.182
Ibn Kathir’s point is that any benefit gained by insulting others’ false gods is 
outweighed by the harm of provoking their worshippers to insult the Lord of the 
Worlds—not, of course, because their insults will harm Him, but because they will feel 
bitter toward Islam and Muslims and move farther away from Islam’s guidance. Thus, 
the Quran instructs Muslims to abstain from doing so for the sake of the greater good. 
Likewise, from the aforementioned hadith forbidding insulting another’s parents, the 
Maliki hadith scholar and jurisprudent Ibn Battal (d. 1054) derived the principle that 
“one whose action leads to something prohibited, then that action is prohibited, even 
if he did not intend something prohibited.”183 Similarly, Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani explains 
that the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص overlooked the Jew’s insult “for the maslaha of harmonious 
relations,”184 a conclusion that ash-Shawkani reached as well.185 The discussion by 
these scholars demonstrates that in determining the value of an action, Islamic law 
takes into account the balance of its harm and benefit.
In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that a law such as Section 295-C only 
encourages people to disparage the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, repels people from Islam, provides 
a platform for defaming the religion, and detracts from the maslaha and purposes of 
Islamic law.
َمْلُعوٌن َمْن َسبَّ َوالَِدْيه
ه هُ فَيَُسبُّ أُمَّ ُجِل فَيَُسبُّ أَبَاهُ َويَُسبُّ أُمَّ يَُسبُّ أَبَا الرَّ
180 See, for example, Mohshin Habib. 2013. “Muslim Persecution of Christians Escalating in Pakistan.” 
Gatestone Institute, April 9. https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3664/christian-persecution-pakistan.
181 Quran, Surah al-An‘am 6:108
182 Imam Abul-Fida Ismail ibn Kathir. 2003. Vol. 3 of Tafsir ibn Kathir. Riyadh: Darussalaam, 436-37. 
Emphasis added. The hadith cited by Ibn Kathir is found, among other places, in al-Bukhari. 1997, vol. 8, 
18.
183 Quoted in Al-‘Asqalani. 1986. Vol. 10, 418. In Arabic: من آل فعله إلى محرم يحرم عليه ذلك الفعل وإن لم يقصد 
إلى ما يحرم
184 Al-‘Asqalani. 1986. Vol. 11, 46. Ibn Hajar said: ذلك كان لمصلحة التآلف





In his unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Mumtaz Qadri argued 
that he had “acted under the influence of some religious speakers ... whose inciting, 
provocative and instigating speeches made in a religious meeting” so inflamed his emotions 
that “his conduct in the matter was not that of a free agent acting on his own.”186 In a video 
of that meeting, held four days before the murder in the city where it occurred, Mufti Hanif 
Qureshi harangues the crowd:
And we explicitly say it without mincing any words that if the death penalty was 
not provided in Section 295-C for the blasphemers in that case Allah has given 
us the courage. We know how to trigger a gun, how to shoot somebody dead, and 
how to behead those who commit blasphemy against our beloved Prophet!
(Crowd) We are the protectors of the dignity of the holy Prophet! We will sacrifice 
our lives for the dignity of the holy Prophet!
Let them know those who consider Sunnis are cowards that Allah has honored us with 
the courage and power to strangle those involved in blasphemy, to cut their tongues, 
and to riddle their bodies with bullets. For this, nobody can arrest us under any law. 
The punishment of the blasphemer is only death! The blasphemer of the Prophet has 
no right to live!
(Crowd) We are the servants of the holy Prophet and are ready to die for him! If 
there is no love for the holy Prophet, life is useless! He who is the friend of the 
blasphemer is a traitor!
Dear listeners! We are very polite people. We are peace-loving people, but we can’t 
tolerate disrespect and blasphemy of our holy Prophet. It gives us unbearable 
pain! We cannot let any blasphemer be alive in Pakistan!187 
This discourse is representative of the essential emotions and principles 
that motivate Pakistani supporters of the death penalty for those who disparage 
the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. The murder of the blasphemer is considered an act in defense of 
the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص dignity and thus an expression of love for him. It demonstrates 
that Sunni Muslims are neither weak nor cowardly, and also alleviates the psychic 
pain caused by the knowledge that this revered figure has been insulted. But if the 
supporters would reflect, they would see that these concerns are unfounded or may be 
resolved peacefully and thereby avoid the above-mentioned harm and corruption that 
attend violent responses to such allegations.
Love and Honor of the Prophet 4ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
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Love of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص Does not Require
Killing non-Muslims who Insult Him
Allah says in the Quran:
The Prophet is closer to the believers than their own selves.188
Likewise, the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:
None of you will have faith till he loves me more than his father,
his children and all of humanity.189
Thus, loving the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is a condition of faith. Ibn Taymiyya said: “The 
Muslims are unanimously agreed that the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is the greatest of creation in 
status before Allah, and no other created being has any status that is higher than his or 
any power of intercession that is greater than his.”190 It should therefore be no surprise 
that Muslims would take such insults very seriously, for the Lord of the Worlds chose 
him ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, above all of creation, to convey the religion to humanity. He was persecuted 
and driven out of his hometown so that humanity would be guided. And yet, as his 
wife Aisha said, he only took revenge when something Allah had forbidden had been 
transgressed.191 The Quran instructs the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and the Muslims that when 
others abuse them:
Show forgiveness, enjoin what is good, and turn away from the ignorant.192 
النَّبِيُّ أَْولَى بِاْلُمْؤِمنِيَن ِمْن أَنفُِسِهْم
الَ يُْؤِمُن أََحُدُكْم َحتَّى أَُكوَن أََحبَّ إِلَْيِه ِمْن َوالِِدِه َوَولَِدِه َوالنَّاِس أَْجَمِعيَن
ُخِذ اْلَعْفَو َوْأُمْر بِاْلُعْرِف َوأَْعِرْض َعِن اْلَجاِهلِيَن 
186 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State. 2015, 33. Pakistani investigators reportedly obtained 
a video of Qadri at this meeting. See “Taseer murder case: ‘Inspirational’ clerics given bail.” 2011. The 
Express Tribune. January 9. https://tribune.com.pk/story/106934/taseer-murder-case-inspirational-clerics-
given-bail/.
187 Sunni Media. 2014. “Mufti Hanif Qureshi’s sermon with English Subs which made Mumtaz Qadri 
to kill Salman Taseer.” December 6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAMalouD0Ns.
188 Quran, Surah al-Ahzab 33:6.
189 Al-Bukhari. 1997, vol. 1, 61.
190 Ahmad ibn ‘Abdul-Halim ibn Taymiyya. 2005. Vol 1 of Majmu‘a al-Fatawa. Al-Mansurah: Dar al-
Wafa, 115.
191 Al-Bukhari. 1997. Vol. 8, 444.
192 Quran, Surah al-A‘raf 7:199.
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When this verse was revealed, the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص turned to Angel Gabriel and 
asked, “What does it mean, O Gabriel?” Gabriel replied, “Allah commands you to forgive 
those who wronged you, give to those who deprived you, and keep relations with those 
who cut theirs with you.”193 The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص embodied this spirit. As discussed earlier, 
when a Jew passed by him and mocked the Muslim greeting by wishing death upon 
him, he told the Companions to do nothing more than merely respond, “And upon 
you.” As the Quran tells the Prophet and the Muslims:
And you will surely hear much abuse from those given the Scripture before you 
and from the idolaters. But if you are patient and God-fearing, then verily that 
is true steadfastness.194 
And:
Be patient with whatever they say.195 
The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص exhibited this forbearance not only with verbal abuse, but 
also with physical attacks. When a Jewish woman tried to kill him by giving him some 
poisoned mutton, his Companions asked, “Should we kill her?” and he said, “No.” 196 
In his Book of Morals and Manners, al-Bukhari placed this hadith in the section “The 
Book of Dealing with People Cheerfully,” under the heading “Excusing and Pardoning 
People.”197  The Quran states:
And we have sent you (O Muhammad) only as a mercy to all the worlds.198 
Ibn Kathir explains that this verse means that the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was sent as a mercy to 
Muslims and non-Muslims.199  The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:
I was not sent as a curse, but rather as a mercy.200 
َوَمآ أَْرَسْلنَـَك إاِلَّ َرْحَمةً لِّْلَعـلَِميَن
إِنِّي لَْم أُْبَعْث لَعَّانًا، َوإِنََّما بُِعْثُت َرْحَمة
َولَتَْسَمُعنَّ ِمَن الَِّذيَن أُوتُوْا اْلِكتَـَب ِمن قَْبلُِكْم َوِمَن الَِّذيَن أَْشَرُكوْا أًَذى َكثِيراً
َوإِن تَْصبُِروْا َوتَتَّقُوْا فَإِنَّ ذلَِك ِمْن َعْزِم ااْلُمور
َواْصبِْر َعلَى َما يَقُولُوَن
193 Imam Abul-Fida Ism‘ail ibn Kathir. 2003. Vol. 4 of Tafsir ibn Kathir. Riyadh: Darussalaam, 241.
194 Quran, Surah Ali ‘Imran 3:185.
195 Quran, Surah al-Muzzamil 73:10.
196 Muhammad ibn Isma‘il al-Bukhari. 2000. Adab al-Mufrad. Jubail: Dar as-Siddiq, 91.
197 Ibid.
198 Quran, Surah al-Anbiya’ 21:107.
199 Ibn Kathir 2003, vol. 6, 511-512.
200 Al-Bukhari 1997, vol. 6, 460.
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Would the Arabs’ hearts have softened to Islam if the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص had gone about 
seeking vengeance from anyone who spoke a harsh word against him? In As-Subki’s 
words: “We know from the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and his kindness, mercy, and compassion, 
that he never took revenge for himself, but only did so when the sanctities of God were 
violated, and then he took vengeance for God ... so how is vengeance taken for his sake 
after his death?”201 It was from the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص deep wisdom and insight that grace 
in the face of insult is among the most disarming and attractive of all human qualities. 
In this he embodied the Quran’s teaching:
Repel evil with that which is better. Then verily, he, between whom and you there 
was enmity, will become as though he was a close friend. But none is granted that 
except those who are patient.202 
Thus, Rabbi Zayd ibn Sun’a of Medina related the signs of true prophethood that he 
recognized in Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص that led him to accept Islam: “His forbearance overcame 
his anger, and his patience would increase with intense abuse.”203 The Companion 
Abdullah bin ‘Amr said the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was described in an earlier revealed scripture 
as follows: “He is not severe, harsh, or obscene in the marketplace, nor does he respond 
to evil with evil. Rather, he forgives and pardons.”204 The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:
Verily, gentleness is not found in anything except that it beautifies it, and it is 
not removed from anything except that it disgraces it.205 
Loving the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص does not mean participating in riots, mobs, and 
assassinations; rather, it means modeling our character on his. He did not respond 
to mockery or abuse with violence, but with gentleness, patience, and kindness. This 
is not “cowardice,” but wisdom and forbearance, both of which softened people’s 
hearts toward Islam until they entered it in droves. If our character and actions are 
the opposite of the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and cause the people to flee from Islam in revulsion, 
then we must question whether we truly understand what it means to love him.
اْدفَْع بِالَّتِى ِهَى أَْحَسُن فَإَِذا الَِّذى بَْينََك َوبَْينَهُ َعَداَوةٌ
َكأَنَّهُ َولِىٌّ َحِميٌم َوَما يُلَقَّاَها إاِلَّ الَِّذيَن َصبَُروْا
ْفَق اَل يَُكوُن فِي َشْيٍء إاِلَّ َزانَهُ َواَل يُْنَزُع ِمْن َشْيٍء إاِلَّ َشانَهُ إِنَّ الرِّ
201 See n. 50.
202 Quran, Surah al-Fussilat 41:35-36.
203 Abu Hatim Muhammad ibn Hibban. [N.d.] Vol. 1 of Sahih Ibn Hibban. Lahore: Shabbir Brothers, 443.
204 Related in Ibn Kathir, commentary on Surah Ali ‘Imran 3:159.
205 Muslim ibn Hajjaj. 2007, vol 6, 456.
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The Honor of Islam and Muslims is not Vindicated
by Killing non-Muslims who Insult the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
Those who believe that this revered figure’s dignity is offended by such 
statements or enhanced by violent responses to such statements are sorely mistaken, 
for Allah Himself has elevated the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص reputation:
And have We not raised high your reputation? 206 
It is from this exaltation that Allah and the angels who accompany His throne exalt the 
Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص name:
Verily, Allah and His angels shower blessings on the Prophet. O you who believe! 
Ask blessings on him and salute him with a worthy salutation.207 
And the Quran describes the Day of Judgment as:
The day when Allah will not humiliate the Prophet and those who believe with him. 
Their light will run before them and on their right hands. They will say: “Our Lord! 
Perfect our light for us and forgive us! Lo! You are able to do all things.” 208 
Thus, not only has Allah elevated his dignity and reputation, as well as those of his 
followers, by mentioning him to the angels, but He has also caused the angels to sing his 
praises, made him beloved to the believers, and will honor him and those with him on 
the Day of Judgment. To believe, therefore, that his dignity and reputation are harmed 
one iota by ignorant or malicious muttering betrays a lack of confidence in the security 
of his position. The most powerful defense of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص against those who 
would denigrate him is to follow his Sunnah, embody his character, and demonstrate 
magnanimity, dignity, and patience toward others. The worst insult to the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص 
comes from those Muslims who repudiate his Sunnah and heap calumnies upon him by 
engaging in shameful displays of raging emotion and violence in his name.
َوَرفَْعنَا لََك ِذْكَرَك
َ َوَملَـئَِكـتَهُ يَُصلُّوَن َعلَى النَّبِىِّ يأَيَُّها الَِّذيَن َءاَمنُوْا َصلُّوْا َعلَْيِه َوَسلُِّموْا تَْسلِيماً إِنَّ للاَّ
ُ النَّبِيَّ َوالَِّذيَن آَمنُوا َمَعهُ نُوُرُهْم يَْسَعى بَْيَن أَْيِديِهْم َوبِأَْيَمانِِهْم يَْوَم اَل يُْخِزي للاَّ
يَقُولُوَن َربَّنَا أَْتِمْم لَنَا نُوَرنَا َواْغفِْر لَنَا إِنََّك َعلَى ُكلِّ َشْيٍء قَِدير
206 Quran, Surah al-Inshirah 94:4.
207 Quran, Surah al-Ahzab 33:56. Ibn Kathir relates that salah, translated here as “blessings,” means that 
“Allah praises the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص before the angels, and the salah of the angels is their supplication” for him.





As we have seen above, “[h]istorically, through the use of certain legal canons... 
Muslim jurists developed a highly sophisticated and internally regulated method for 
adjusting [Islamic law] to changing social contexts in a way that reflected the politico-
legal institutional architecture and core substantive values of their societies and 
times.”209 We have discussed how the sources of the shariah, the Quran and hadith, and 
the principles set forth by classical jurists for deriving guidance from them to govern 
human affairs point inexorably to the necessity of decriminalizing blasphemy by non-
Muslims in Pakistan. Realistically, however, there are serious obstacles to such a reform.
One of the main obstacles is structural. “Modern Pakistani law, despite the 
constitutional commitment to observe the injunctions of Islam, operates ‘on the basis that 
the modern state law is the dominant legal authority.’ In other words, it follows the modern 
Western paradigm except that it seeks to adapt the paradigm to Islamic concepts.” 210 
Pakistan’s “Islamization” program proceeded on the assumption that “to return to sharia 
one should just amend here and there the existing positive-law constitutions and statutes; 
or assert that a modern state is Islamic if its legislature pays respect to general Islamic 
legal precepts, such as bans on prostitution or gambling…”211 “Ironically, these Shariah 
legislation efforts operate from a European paradigm of the nation-state, rather than pre-
colonial Muslim norms of law and government, and thus stand in the way of deeper, more 
creative and authentic thinking about Islamic constitutionalism in the modern world.”212 
As one scholar has noted about the Ottoman attempt to codify Islamic law on 
a European model, Pakistan’s “Islamization” project has, ironically, “challenged not 
only the position of Islamic law in the state judiciary but also the way Islamic law was 
traditionally interpreted and applied.”213 This process “basically deprived Islamic jurists 
of their authority in the law-finding process and transferred it to secular legislatures.”214 
Islamic law scholar Intisar Rabb has explained that the attempt to incorporate Islamic 
Obstacles to Reform
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law into a constitutional system while excluding Islamic jurists “actually may prevent 
political and judicial reform” in those countries
where there is either informal or coordinate constitutionalization of 
Islamic law, but where judges who have no Islamic law expertise have 
been empowered to interpret the law without adequate interpretive 
tools for doing so. In such cases, they tend to crystallize the law without 
attempting jurisprudential methods to reform it, and exclude the jurists 
equipped to do so (if they are so inclined—which is, admittedly, quite 
another question.) ... In such situations, the state has constitutionalized 
Islamic law, but the institutional arrangement has removed legitimate 
methods for its dynamic growth or reform by excluding Islamic law 
experts from the interpretive project … In short, the judicialization of 
Islamic law without professional juristic expertise prevents, rather than 
encourages, legal reform on Islamic grounds.215 
A paradigmatic case is that of Section 295-C, which was introduced in Parliament via a 
martial law-era amendment and debated by legislators who, to say the least, were non-
specialists in Islamic law. Moreover, courts that review accusations under Section 295-C 
lack the discretion, flexibility, and expertise in Islamic jurisprudence to employ classical 
juridical methods such as the high standard of proof, the doctrine of lenity, discretionary 
punishments, and the pursuit of maslaha, to mitigate the statute’s severity.216
Moreover, because the blasphemy laws are supported by “a vocal and active 
portion of the population that has shown a consistent willingness to use violence to 
exact ‘justice’ on alleged blasphemers and politicians who speak against the laws,”217 
attempts to amend these laws are generally undertaken by reformers seen as secular 
opponents of religion in public life. This “creates fierce ‘Islam’ vs. ‘secularism’ political 
fights that are hard to dislodge,”218 for such fights cast proponents as defenders of the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and a faith under siege, and opponents as champions of secular progress 
and the values of human rights. This false dichotomy paralyzes any reform attempt 
and precludes substantive discussion about whether these laws are even “Islamic” to 
begin with or, what amounts to the same thing, whether they promote maslaha.
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Pakistan’s blasphemy law began life as a colonial-era penal code that was 
subsequently amended under martial law. Contrary to the assumptions underlying it, 
there is no ‘ijma that non-Muslims who insult the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص must be killed. The 
most definitive Hanafi opinion is that this a ta’zir offense that need not be punished 
at all, depending on where the maslaha lies. Moreover, it is not even arguable that the 
public good is served by applying this law to non-Muslims, for history shows that it 
results erodes the rule of law and initiates inter-community strife; oppresses the weak 
and the poor; and damages the reputation of Muslims, Islam, and the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. 
We have demonstrated that it is not blasphemy, treason, or a Western conspiracy 
to argue that Section 295-C should not be applied to non-Muslims. Rather, those who 
claim to defend the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص reputation by fomenting chaos and oppression 
are the ones who have defamed him and betrayed the message with which he was 
sent. True love of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصis expressed by following his sunnah; emulating 
his qualities of dignity, patience, justice, and kindness; and pursuing the well-being of 
humanity as a whole, regardless of religion or lack thereof.
Alleviating the harm caused by this policy is a thorny problem, given that the 
traditional methods of the ulema are not viable under Pakistan’s existing legislative 
and judicial arrangement, and that the national discourse as to this policy is locked in 
a completely unnecessary controversy over shariah and secularism. It is unnecessary 
because the determinative question from the point of view of Islamic law is whether 
this policy advances the public interest. Insofar as this should also be the determinative 
question for Christians, Hindus, or people of no religion, there is no reason to be 
sidetracked by debates over religion and secularism. Ibn al-Qayyim said, “Allah the 
Exalted has made clear in His law that the objective is the establishment of justice 
between his servants and fairness among the people, so whichever path leads to justice 
and fairness is part of the religion and can never oppose it.”219 
Conclusion
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I recommend three avenues for addressing the problem of Section 295-C. 
1. The President of Pakistan should direct law enforcement agencies to stop enforcing 
the provision against non-Muslims and pardon any non-Muslims accused or convicted 
under it. This would prevent its further use as a tool of inter-community strife and 
personal vendettas, as well as alleviate the injustice and personal damage suffered by 
those wrongly affected by its enforcement. 
2. A petition should be brought before the Federal Shariat Court asking it to declare 
the enforcement of Section 295-C against non-Muslims repugnant to the shariah. 
Proposed grounds for this petition are: (1) Abu Hanifah, al-Bukhari, ath-Thawri, 
and others considered that no punishment was warranted for non-Muslims who 
disparage the Prophet 2) ;ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص) in the alternative, the dominant Hanafi opinion is 
that such disparagement is a ta‘zir offense, meaning that a discretionary punishment 
or no punishment at all as is to be determined by the public interest, an option that 
the current law does not provide; and (3) the maslaha in the case will be best served 
by suspending the enforcement of Section 295-C against non-Muslims pending 
consideration of the issue by the legislature in terms of how this statue is harming 
Pakistani society. If it is argued that the statute is not repugnant to the shariah on the 
grounds that many Hanafi scholars who viewed disparagement of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص as 
merely a ta‘zir offense still allowed execution as a potential punishment, the answer is 
that they allowed execution for public policy reasons at a time when blasphemy took 
the form of sedition and insurrection, not in the case of arguments between illiterate 
peasant women, the graffiti of impoverished children, or the babbling of the mentally 
disabled, as Section 296-C currently mandates due to the way it is written and enforced.
3. Religious leaders should acknowledge that the shariah does not require the death 
penalty in such cases, much less the assassination of Muslims or others who say that 
such a punishment is optional. They should announce that calling for assassinations 
and organizing riots and mobs does not show love for the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, but rather 
violates the shariah, sows corruption in the land, and supports the agenda of those who 
are hostile to Islam. Furthermore, they should acknowledge and teach their followers 
that true love for the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص calls for embodying his character traits of dignity, 






‘Aqd adh-dhimma (الذمة  An ‘aqd is a covenant or treaty. Historically, in an Islamic :(عقد 
imperial polity, the ‘aqd adh-dhimma was a covenant of protection between non-Muslim subjects 
and a Muslim government that permitted the former to reside peacefully within Muslim lands 
and comprised rules governing the scope of their liberty and behavior.
Dhimmi (ذمي): A non-Muslim party to the ‘aqd adh-dhimma who permanently resided in an 
Islamic imperial polity. 
Fatwa (فتوى): An authoritative, non-binding legal opinion given by an Islamic jurist in response 
to a question.
Hadd (حد; pl. hudud, حدود): Literally, “limit.” A mandatory, fixed punishment defined in the 
Quran or hadith for certain serious offenses.
Hadith (حديث): Literally, a “report,” “account,” or “occurrence”; a report of the speech, actions, 
approval or disapproval, and appearance of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. The hadith are a means by which 
the Sunnah (q.v.) is known. Along with the Quran, it is a canonical source of religious law as well 
as spiritual and moral guidance.  
Ijma‘ (إجماع ): A consensus or agreement among Islamic scholars on a religious issue; the third 
most important source of Islamic law after the Quran and Sunnah.
Ikhtilaf (إختلف): A disagreement among Islamic scholars about a religious issue. The opposite of ijma‘.
Jizya (جزية ): A poll tax paid by a dhimmi to enter into the ‘aqd adh-dhimma.
Madhhab (مذهب): A school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence defined by a core legal 
doctrine and attributed to a founding jurist. Within Sunni Islam, the four major madhabs are 
the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. The predominant madhab of Pakistan is Hanafi.
Mafsada (مفسدة): Harm to the public interest or individual, corruption, and the opposite of 
maslaha.
Maslaha (مصلحة): Literally, “righteousness” or “goodness,” that which benefits the public and 
the private individual, and the public good or commonweal.
Shariah (شريعة ): Literally, “way” or “road,” the idealized law of God for His creation concerning 
how to behave in this world. The sources of information about this law are the Quran and the 
sunnah.
Siyasa (سياسة): Laws or policies made by Muslim rulers concerning matters left unspecified in 
the Quran and Sunnah, generally in the realm of governance and public order, and in pursuit of 
the public interest (maslaha).
Sunnah (سنة): The lived example of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and, along with the Quran, one of the two 
sources of the shariah. The Sunnah is known primarily, though not solely, through the hadith.
Ta‘zir (تعزير): An offense whose punishment is not specified in the Quran or hadith and, as 
such, is handed down at the judge’s discretion.
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